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developing regions will play
an expanded role in the
A New  Role for  Developing  world economy.  Economic
Countries  in an Integrating  World  development  will be
propelled by rapid growth in
world  trade and accelerated
integration of trade and
capital flows. Dragging the
old anti-export bias  (typically
manifested  in overvalued
currency) into the rapidly
globalizing market  will be
dangerous, even suicidal, for
developing countries.
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Summary  findings
Otsubo reviews trends and developments in world trade,  the mid-1980s, representing a shift from an inward-
investigating the elements involved in the accelerated  oriented development strategy to an outward-oriented
integration  of world trade in the past decade. Focusing  one.
on the changing strategies and role of low- and middle-  *  World trade will grow more than 6 percent a year
income countries, Otsubo explores what conditions and  (on average) in the coming decade, but prospects for
policy initiatives make it easier for countries to benefit  trade integration differ by region. East Asia, with its
from global trade and capital flows. He concludes:  sizable market and autonomous forces of regional
* World trade relative to world income has grown  integration, should experience sustained integration into
more in the  1990s than  in the 1970s or 1980s, mainly  the world market. In Latin America, Eastern Europe, and
because of three factors: the desynchronization of  Central Asia, continued  integration into world trade will
business cycles in Japan,  Europe, and the United States;  depend on capital inflows. Countries in the Middle East,
the expanded role in world trade of developing  North  Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa have depended and
countries, especially in East Asia and Latin America; and  will continue to depend on favorable terms of trade and
the transfer of purchasing power (in the form of  on capital flows for integration  into the world market.
international capital flows) that supported  heightened  (And Sub-Saharan Africa will remain dependent  on
import demand among developing countries.  official capital flows.)
* Measured as the ratio of trade to output, the trend  *  Balanced integration - with export and import
toward global integration accelerated sharply in the mid-  capacities expanding sustainably - can be achieved only
1980s, with a reversal in the once-slowed trend toward  through prudent,  complementary domestic and border
trade integration  for OECD countries. A wave of  policies that encourage long-term productive investment
liberalization among low- and middle-income countries  in the export sector.
resulted in an upward kink in their trade/output  ratio in
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Introduction
1.  The observed robustness of world trade growth in the early 1990s, when OECD
economies were successively in recession, turned our attention toward the changing and
expanded role of low and middle income countries (LMICs) in world trade. This naturally
led to the following set of questions:
a)  How importantly have LMICs contributed to the sustained growth in world trade in
the 1990s?
b)  What are the elements that supported the LMICs'  expanded role in creating trade?
c)  Are these elements temporary, or are they structural and likely to stay?
d)  Has there been a sea change in development strategy, a shift from an inward-oriented
to an outward-oriented framework designed to create a virtuous cycle of higher
integration and faster growth under an expanded opportunity set?
e)  Who have been successful integrators into global trade market?  Who have been
unsuccessful integrators? Who have been lagging integrators?
f)  What separates successful integrators from others?  What implications for integration
strategy can be drawn from past successes and failures?
27.  This study reviews the past trends and recent developments in globalization
through trade integration. It also investigates both short-term cyclical and longer-term
structural elements underlying the accelerated process of global trade integration observed
in the past decade, focusing on the changing strategy of and role for LNMICs.  The study
also discusses the overall prospects for the coming decade, and explores the set of
conditions and policv initiatives found among the set of successful and sustained
integrators of LMICs.
Developments in World Trade in the Early 1990s-Decoupling  of Trade and Output?
3.  The growth of world trade relative to world income has been much higher in the
1990s than anything experienced in the 1970s or 1980s. In 1994, world merchandise trade
volume is estimated to have grown by 9.2 percent, which, in relation to world GDP
growth of 2.8 percent, implies an elasticity of world trade of 3.3 with respect to GDP.
That is more than twice the 1.5 trade elasticity that prevailed in the 1970s  and 1980s. It is
also much higher than in any single year in that period, including 1976 and 1984, which,
like 1994, were years of cyclical upswing from world recession.  Even more remarkable,
although world trade growth slowed from a buoyant 6.1 percent in the late 1980s,  when
world output expanded by an average of 3.3 percent, it maintained an average of
4.1 percent in the recessionary period 1991-93, when world GDP growth averaged only1.1 percent.  The 3.7 average world trade elasticity in 1991-93 was even higher than in
1994. By contrast, world trade had experienced negative growth in the previous two
recessions-negative  3.0 percent in 1974-75 and negative 1 percent in 1981-82. Have we
therefore observed a decoupling of world trade and output movements?
4.  Three major factors worked in favor of sustaining trade growth in 1991-93: the
desynchronization of business cycles in the United States, Japan, and Europe; the
continuation and even acceleration of growth in the developing world, notably in East
Asia and Latin America, which became the new growth poles; and the effective transfer of
purchasing power through a surge in private capital flows to highly absorbent LMIC
regions, namely East Asia and Latin America.
5.  In contrast to the two previous cycles, when OECD countries were subject to
common external shocks-the  two oil price hikes-and  pursued similar policy responses,
including sharp monetary tightening, the last downturn in the industrial countries was
inspired more by forces internal to each country or region.  In the United States, these
forces were corporate balance sheet deterioration at the end of the 1980s and fiscal
consolidation; in Japan, the "bubble economy" in the second half of the 1980s and the
subsequent collapse in stock and property markets;  in Europe, the stimulus of German
unification and the subsequent monetary tightening needed to curb inflationary
consequences. Desynchronized  business cycles were reflected in a more stable pattern of
overall OECD import demand, which grew on average by 1.8 percent a year in 1991-93,
compared to declines of more than 1  percent in 1975 and 2.7 percent in 1981-82.
6.  A noteworthy factor in the recent dynamism of world trade has been the new role
of the developing countries, especially in East Asia and Latin America.  In 1991-93,
output growth accelerated in these two regions despite a slowdown in the world
aggregate.  East Asia's output grew by an average of 8.7 percent a year in 1991-93,
accelerating from 7.4 percent average yearly growth in the preceding decade. In Latin
America, output grew an average of 3.2 percent a year during 1991-93, accelerating from
1.2 percent average yearly growth in the 1980s. During this period, 54 percent of the
growth of world trade volume was generated by the LMICs, excluding Former Soviet
Union, despite their share of less than 20 percent in total world trade in 1991. East Asia's
and Latin America's contributions were 29 percent and 17 percent, respectively.
7.  Despite the ongoing OECD recovery, the OECD share of contribution is not
expected to reach the high levels observed in earlier business cycle recovery phases,
reflecting the projected high pace of LMIC trade integration.  In fact, OECD's
contribution to incremental world trade growth will be limited to just over 60 percent, and
LMIfCs  will continue to claim about a quarter of the growth in world import demand (of
which more than half will accrue to East Asia).  The increased role of LMICs  in trade
creation is likely to stay.
8.  Finally, there was a surge of private capital flows to developing countries,
motivated in part by successful policy reforms and export success. Flows totaled$325 billion during 1991-93  and an estimated additional $173 billion in 1994, and
provided, for the recipient countries, much more financing for imports than they were able
to use.  During the oil price hikes of 1973-74 and 1979-80, purchasing power was
transferred to oil exporting countries through changes in terns  of trade (and eventually
reached other LMIC regions, notably Latin America, in the form of private capital flows).
These transfers were translated into higher import demand by direct and indirect recipient
regions.  A surge in capital flows-targeted  to highly absorbent regions such as East Asia
and Latin America-has  been creating heightened import demand among recipients in a
more direct manner, supporting the growth of world trade.
9.  Results from Granger causality tests between reserve positions and nomninal
import values (goods and services) imply that import capacity tends to be strongly binding
in Latin America, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Europe and Central Asia (ECA);
and rmildly  binding in Middle East and North Africa. It is not likely to be a binding factor
in East Asian import demand. However, in Asia, a surge in import demand has been
largely sustained by regional trade integration, fueled by intra-regional foreign direct
investments and by expansion in trade-related credits.  In 1991-93, on average, foreign
direct investment accounted for 54 percent of private long-term capital inflow into East
Asia, followed by private loans dominated by banks'  export credits guaranteed  by official
and private export credit institutions.  By looking at recent movements in net resource
flows to LMIC regions and the contribution of these regions to world trade, and by
noting the aforementioned aspects of East Asian capital flows, it becomes obvious that the
recent surges in private capital flows into these regions have supported high import
demand out of these regions.
Waves of Liberalization since the Mid 1980s-A  Revolution in Development Strategy
10.  The 1991 inaugural issue of the World Bank's  Global Economic Prospects and
the Developing Countries (GEP9I)  stated that:
All through  the period 1950-90,  international  trade grew  faster than output. The
rapid  growth  of world  trade in the 1950s and 1960s was due partly to a recovery
from the stagnation  of the interwar years.  It was spurred  by buoyant  growth in
industrial countries,  reduced barriers to trade, low world inflation,  modest real
rates of interest,  and expanding  real resource transfers to developing  countries.
But many  of these  trends were reversed in the 1970s  and 1980s. The growth  of
international  trade slowed markedly and  the gap  with world output growth
narrowed.... The forces for trade liberalization  have weakened  since the mid
1970s, when industrial  countries began to establish new barriers to trade.  By
1986, almost 16  percent of OECD imports were covered  by nontariff  barriers....
The protectionist  trend  in developing  countries  has been  similar.
11.  Looking back, however, there was a marked acceleration in world integration
through trade again in the mid 1980s.  Measured by a ratio of trade to output, this meant a
reversal in the trend in trade integration for OECD, which had been slowed by the
macroeconomic instabilities and heightened nontariff barriers in the 1970s  and early1980s-an  evolution in the process of economic integration. Emerging LMIC markets, a
decline in commodity  prices, a surge in foreign investment activities after the Plaza accord,
and a series of bilateral and regional trade arrangements such as an expansion of the EU
and the US-Canada free trade agreement, put OECD economies back on an accelerated
integration path.
12.  For LMIC as a whole, a rising trend in trade integration was a rather new
phenomenon.  In fact, out of the 16 percent rise in LMICs' trade integration ratio
(trade/GDP) in the past three and a half decades, a 15 percent surge was observed only
after the mid 1980s. From the mid 1980s until the early 1990s, an increasing number of
developing economies were liberalizing trade, mostly unilaterally. In Asia, liberalization
spread from Taiwan and Korea to Southeast Asia and on to China. In Latin America, it
spread from Chile to Mexico and beyond.  This largely unilateral wave of liberalization
among LMICs that resulted in an upward kink in the trend of their trade/output ratio since
the mid 1980s represents  an effective shift in development strategy from an inward-
oriented to an outward-oriented framework designed to form a virtuous cycle of higher
integration and faster growth under an expanded opportunity set-a  revolution in
development strategy.
13.  What happened in the early 1990s, often characterized as trade-output decoupling,
was an enormous acceleration in the speed of LMIC trade integration into the world
market (defined as a rate of growth of trade minus that of output), which compensated for
a deceleration in trade integration among OECD, where integration is highly pro-cyclical.
Between two adjacent periods of smooth world output expansion (1986-90) and OECD
recession (1991-93), world aggregate speed of trade integration was in fact kept, on
average, at a constant level.  However, the movements in different income groups were
startlingly dissimilar. LMICs have seen tremendous acceleration in the speed of trade
integration, from a slow pace of 0.7 percent a year to a galloping 6.4 percent a year, while
OECD's pace of integration decelerated from over 3 percent a year to 1.1 percent a year
in the latter half of the 1980s.  With LMICs playing an increased role in the world trade
market, a robust trade growth of over 6 percent a year, on average, is projected for the
coming,  decade.
Balance and Sustainability of LMICs' Integration into Global Markets
14.  Liberalization measures taken by the developing countries since the mid 1980s
have paved the way for these economies to integrate into the world market in order to
enjoy faster growth under an expanded opportunity set.  However, the path to integration
has not been smooth for every country or region.
15.  The first phase of trade policy reform in East Asia, in which obstacles to exporting
were removed, typically involved unifying and devaluing the exchange rate and eliminating
quantitative restrictions on imports of intermediate and capital goods. The second phase,
in which tariffs began to be gradually reduced, generally commenced only after the balance
of payments was strengthened. China, Indonesia, and the Philippines initiated reform withsubstantial real depreciation, but only China and Indonesia sustained and even enlarged  the
level of devaluation. The Philippines experienced real appreciation from the year of
reform to 1992. Indonesia succeeded in trade integration in both exports and imports
during the adjustment process.  The Philippines also experienced higher trade integration
through expansion of both sides; however, import growth overtook export growth due to
real appreciation, which resulted in persistent balance of payments problems.
16.  In Latin America, liberalization reduced both import/export impediments (tariff
rates and quantitative restrictions) and restrictions on foreign exchange markets. Reforms
in Chile, Columbia, and Mexico-the  early reformers-were  characterized by initial
efforts to devalue their currencies.  Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela-the  late
reformers-had  a higher degree of anti-export bias and distortions manifested in higher
black market premia before the reform.  Initially, the premia were reduced in these
economies, except in Brazil, where galloping inflation undermined the reform efforts.  All
major Latin American reformers achieved a higher pace of trade integration and market
openness. However, an unbalanced import-dominant integration was particularly visible
for Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.  Dominance of import growth was also evident for
Peru.
17.  In Mexico, the aggregate trend rate of trade integration was fairly constant before
and after the reforn.  However, the components shifted drastically during the reform, with
import growth overtaking export growth as the cause of overall trade integration.  Mexico
initially succeeded in depreciating the real effective exchange rate (26.2 percent
depreciation between 1985 and 1986). However, the currency began to appreciate after it
was pegged to the US dollar, as foreign capital inflow revived and nominal depreciation
lagged behind the rate of inflation, producing a net appreciation of 3.7 percent up to 1992.
This undermined the efforts to reduce anti-export bias and brought out an unbalanced
integration. Argentina, Brazil, and Peru all share, by and large, the risk of unbalanced
trade integration, since none of these countries has successfully removed anti-export bias
through their reform package.
18.  In Chile, the trend in export/GDP ratio turned slightly positive in 1991-93, as
opposed to negative 0.9 percent in 1986-90. Although Chile's export success is still
limited in scope, that success has been due to the openness of its import regime and
significant real devaluation of the currency. Chile's commitment to avoiding real
appreciation and maintaining stability in the real exchange rate in order to preserve the
competitiveness of the export sector was noted.  Although, as in Mexico, large capital
inflows had put pressure to appreciate on the Chilean peso, the government had attempted
to stem the short-run inflows to avoid revaluation.  With these prudent reform measures,
Chile's export growth accelerated from 5.6 percent a year, on average, during 1986-90 to
7.5 percent a year for 1991-93 despite the slowdown in OECD. Thus, Chile has a
potential to join the group of successful trade integrators.
19.  Although the LMIC regions are projected to contribute around 30 percent to
incremental world trade during the coming decade, prospects for trade integration differby region. East Asia, with its sizable market and autonomous regional integration forces,
can be considered a structural integrator with prospects of sustained integration into the
world market.  Latin America and Eastern Europe and Central Asia have been contingent
integrators in which the process of integration will continue to depend on capital inflow.
Lagging integrators in Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa have been and
will continue to be dependent on favorable terms of trade and capital flows-in  the case of
Sub-Saharan Africa, official flows-for  their integration into the world market.  So far the
evidence shows that only structural integrators have been able to build a sustainable
virtuous cycle of higher speed of integration and higher output/income growth.
Implications for Integration Strategy
20.  The largely unilateral wave of liberalization among developing countries observed
since the mid 1980s represents an effective shift in development strategy from an inward-
oriented to an outward-oriented (export-promoting) framework designed to create a
virtuous cycle of higher integration and faster growth under an expanded opportunity set.
However, evidence shows that dragging the legacy of the old framework-the  anti-export
bias that is typically manifested in overvalued currency-when  one enters the rapidly
globalizing market is dangerous, even suicidal.  A real exchange appreciation not only
prices exports out of world markets, on the demand side, but also takes resources out of
the tradable (export) sector by increasing the price of nontradables relative to tradables, on
the supply side.  Aggregate effects of the appreciation on investment are ambiguous;
however, this appreciation unambiguously reduces investments in export-oriented sectors.
The failure to foster productivity and export competitiveness by eliminating anti-export
bias in the open framework has resulted in balance of payment difficulties, forced
contraction, and lower levels of growth.
21.  Another problem is that excessive dependence on capital inflow, whether private
investment or official assistance, puts pressure on currency.  Therefore, careful
management is called for.  Official assistance, for instance, should not be carelessly
directed to general expenditures that, on balance, favor nontradable sectors.
22.  Balanced integration to the rapidly globalizing world market calls for sound
growth of exports or a firm commitment for future export growth.  This can be attained
only by a prudent combination of complementary domestic and border policies that
encourage long-term productive investment in the tradable (exportable) sector, supported
by foreign capital and domestic savings drawn in by higher expected rates of return due to
efficiency gains attained through reforms.  Preserving a perceived rate of return on
investment-in  tradable and complementary sectors-for  both domestic and foreign
investors is a key to becoming a structural integrator in which export and import
capacities both expand in a balanced, sustainable manner.  Further research efforts are
called for in identifying possible paths for LMICs to become sustainable, structural
integrators into the world market.I.  Introduction-Globalization  through Trade  Integration
Globalization,  defined  as the integration  of production,  distribution,  and use of
goods and services  among  the economies  of the world, has been evolving  since  the end of
World War II. The signs  of globalization  are manifested  at a factor level  in the increasing
flows of capital and  labor, and at the product  level in a resounding  growth  in world
trade-above  and beyond  the growth  of world output (see Chart 1).
Chart 1. Growth  in World Trade and GDP, 1960-1994
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Source:  International  Economics  Dsputment, World  Bank.
A ratio of trade (exports  and imports)  to output/expenditures  is one  overall  ex-
post measure of world integration.  Speed  of integration,  defined  as the difference  between
the growth  rates of trade  and of GDP, is the first order approximation  of the rate  of
change in the trade/output  ratio, and is commonly  used to measure  the pace of world
integration. World aggregate  trade/output  ratio more than doubled  in the past 35 years,
from 21 percent in 1960  to 46 percent  in 1994. During the same  period,  the  ratio for low
and middle income  countries  (LMIC)' increased  from 31 percent in 1960  to 47 percent  in
1994. The world speed  of integration  has not been constant during  these  years;  there  have
been periods of rapid integration  and stagnation  (see Chart 2). However,  except  for
periods of macro  instability,  the world  has kept a positive pace of integration  since 1950;
that is, international  trade has grown  faster than output. In this context, recent  waves  of
The author is an economist  with the World  Bank's International  Economics  Department.  The
findings,  interpretations,  and  conclusions  are the author's own and should not be attributed  to the
World Bank, its Executive  Board of Directors,  or any of its member  countries.
For income and regional  groupings  of economi.es,  see Appendix A.
Iglobalization-one beginning  in the mid 1980s  and the other in the early 1990s--might  be
seen as a mere evolution  in the process  of economic integration.  Chart 2 shows  that for
LMICs,  however,  the rising  trend  in trade integration  that started  in the mid 1980s  was a
rather new phenomenon.  In fact,  out of the 16 percent rise in LMICs' trade  integration
ratio (trade/GDP)  in the past 35 years,  a 15 percent surge was observed  only after  the mid
1980s. A series of reform  and liberalization  efforts undertaken  by LMICs  in the past
decade represents  an effective  shift in development  strategy  from an inward-oriented
import-substituting  framework  designed  strategically  to reduce  dependence  on the outer
world, to an outward-oriented  export-promoting  framework  designed  to create a virtuous
cycle of higher integration  and faster  growth with expanded  opportunities.  As far as
LMCs are concerned,  therefore,  this upward kink in the integration  trend  is a revolution
that signifies  a shift in development  strategy.
Chart  2. Trade Integration
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2The relocation  and integration  of production processes  across  national  borders  has
been reinforced  by increasing  flows  of private capital, especially  in the form  of foreign
direct  investment  (FDI),  which  is often associated  with global  production  strategies  of
transnational  corporations  (see Chart 3). Technological  progress  that reduces  the cost of
transportation,  communications,  and financial  transactions,  coupled  with declining  trade
barriers,  has enlarged  opportunity  for anyone searching  for less costly  production  bases for
exports and for spot  production  for local markets. From the point of view of the
recipients,  capital  inflows  enlarge  import capacity above and beyond  export  earnings  for a
certain  period. If inflows  are used to increase  domestic supply  capacity  and  augment
international  competitiveness,  countries  are rewarded  with higher  productivity  growth  and
export earnings,  which  preserves  their import capacity in the longer run,  thus  creating  a
virtuous  cycle  of high  growth  and trade integration.
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3Countries  that  failed  to productively  mobilize  the (temporary)  transfer  of
purchasing  power,  through  either  terms of trade changes or capital  inflows,  formed
unbalanced  trade  integration  that  accumulated  debt without  biilding bases  for higher
future export  earnings. Faced  with debt crisis, forced austerity,  and import  compression,
these  economies  had their  long-term  productivity  growth and  export  earning  capacity
hindered  severely. Chart  4 shows  the correlation  between speed  of integration  into world
markets  and GDP growth  for 18  major LMIC economies. Countries  with successful  trade
integration  are seen in the upper  right quadrant,  while economies  with  unbalanced
integration  are situated  in the lower right quadrant.
Chart  4. Speed  of Trade Integration and GDP Growth,  1970-1992
(18 major developing  economies)
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4The following  section  introduces  and analyzes  observed  developments  in world
trade during  the first part of 1990s. It presents seemingly  decoupling  world output and
trade activities  in the early 1990s-sustained world trade growth  in spite  of a slowdown  in
world output  growth-and introduces  three major underlying  factors. The three factors
that worked  in favor  of sustaining  trade growth in the early 1990s  are:  the
desynchronization  of business  cycle  patterns among  the three  growth  poles  in OECD; 2 the
new role of developing  countries  in world trade; and the role of international  capital  flow
as a form of purchasing  power  transfer  in world trade integration.  The emergence  of
new world growth  and  import  engines  in East Asia and Latin  America,  where  output
growth accelerated  into the 1990s  despite the slowdown  in OECD  and in world aggregate
output,  was made  possible,  in turn, by strong growth in domestic  absorption  buoyed by
successful  reform  and  adjustment  policies  in these regions. It was also  made  possible  by
their strong  export growth  brought  by penetration into OECD  markets  and  robust intra-
regional  trade,  and by a surge  in capital inflow that alleviated  import  capacity  limitations.
The third  section  further  investigates  the structural  forces  of the observed  new role
for LMICs. By analyzing  past trends  in LMICs' participation  in international  trade and
world integration-particularly  developments  in the most recent  decade-the paper
confirms  that this new  robustness  in world trade growth  has been  brought  about-at  least
to a substantial  degree-by the structural  changes and liberalization  drives  that many
developing  countries  undertook  in the mid 1980s to early 1990s. This largely  unilateral
wave  of liberalization  among  developing  countries  represents  an effective  shift  in
development  strategy  from an inward-oriented  to an outward-oriented  (export-promoting)
framework  designed  to create  a virtuous  cycle of higher integration  and  faster  growth
under an expanded  opportunity  set. Thus the paper shows  that what happened  in the early
1990s-characterized as trade-output  decoupling-was  an enormous  acceleration  in the
speed of LMIC  trade integration  into the world mnarket,  which  compensated  for a
deceleration  in trade  integration  among  the OECD  countries,  where  the integration  is
highly pro-cyclical.  Given  the surge in outward-oriented  development  strategy,  supported
by a favorable  trade  environment  created  by the GATT Uruguay  Round,  this section  also
uses the BANK-GEM 3 to project  the dynamics of world integration  through  trade for the
coming  decade.  With  LMICs  playing an increased role in the world  trade market,  a robust
trade growth of over 6 percent  a year, on average, is projected  for the coming  decade.
The fourth  section  examnines  the balance and sustainability  of trade  integration  on
the part of developing  countries. Liberalization  measures  taken  by the developing
countries  since  the mid 1980s  have paved the way for these economies  to integrate  into
the world market  in order  to enjoy faster growth under an expanded  opportunity  set.
However,  for some  economies,  the path to integration has not been smooth.  The paper
shows  that dragging  the legacy  of the old inward-looking  strategy  into the globalizing
world-i.e.,  a continuing  anti-export  bias often manifested  in an overvalued  exchange
rate-has  often proved  disastrous. One has to have something  to sell (export)  to join and
2  Throughout  this paper,  OECD  refers  to high-income  OECD countries,  excluding  Mexico.
3  BANK-GEM,  the World  Bank's Global Econometric  Model,  was created  and is maintained  by the
Bank's International  Economics  Department.
5stay in the world market. The paper asserts that a balanced integration into the rapidly
globalizing world market calls for sound growth of exports or a firm commitment for
future export growth. This can be attained only by a prudent combination of
complementary domestic and border policies that encourage long-term productive
investment, supported by savings drawn in by higher expected rates of return due to
efficiency gains from reforms that encourage exports.
The fifth and the final section summarizes the findings and messages of the paper.
Although the LMIC regions are projected to contribute around 30 percent to incremental
world trade during the coming decade, prospects for trade integration differ by region.
East Asia, with its sizable market and autonomous regional integration forces, can be
considered a structural integrator with prospects of sustained integration into the world
market.  Latin America and Eastern Europe and Central Asia have been contingent
integrators in which the process of integration will continue to depend on capital inflow.
The Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa region has been and will continue
to be dependent on favorable terms of trade and capital flows-in  the case of Sub-Saharan
Africa, official flows-for  their integration into the world market.  So far the evidence
shows that only structural integrators have been able to build a sustainable virtuous cycle
of higher speed of integration and higher output/income growth.  Further research efforts
are called for to identify possible paths through which LMICs can become sustainable,
structural integrators into the world market.
6II.  Developments  in World Trade in the Early 1990s-Decoupling of
Trade  and Output  Growth?
Chart 5. Growth of World Exports and GDP, 1971-1997
Percent
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Source:  Irtemagonal  Economics  Department,  Wodd  Bank,  August  1995.
The growth  of world trade relative to world income  has been  much  higher in the
1990s  than  in the 1970s  or 1980s  (see Chart 5). In 1994,  world merchandise  trade volume
is estimated  to have  grown  by 9.2 percent, which, in relation  to world GDP  growth  of
2.8 percent,  implies  an elasticity  of world trade of 3.3 with respect  to GDP. 4 That is more
than twice  the trade  elasticity  of 1.5  that prevailed  in the 1970s  and 1980s. It is also much
higher  than in any single  year  in that period,  including 1976  and 1984,  which,  like 1994,
were years  of cyclical  upswing  from world recession. Even more  remarkable,  although
world trade growth  slowed  from a buoyant 6.1 percent in the late 1980s,  when  world
output  expanded  by an average  of 3.3 percent, it maintained  an average  of 4.1 percent in
4  Growth  in world  export  volume  soared  from 4.4 percent in 1993  to 9.2 percent in 1994,  as the  surge  in
European  import  demand  associated  with  economic  recovery  was  added  to already  strong  import
demand  in the United  States,  East Asia, Latin America, and even Japan (where  a strengthening  yen
and continued  market  opening  and deregulation  have overridden  the effects of domestic  recession).
The data suggest that  these  patterns  have persisted for the most part into 1995,  with  import  demand
continuing  to grow  rapidly  in almost all regions and the stimulus from Europe  remaining  especially
notable.  The  only  exception  is Latin  America,  where  recession  in Mexico  and  accelerated  balance  of
payments  adjustment  in Argentina  are expected to generate  a 3-4 percent fall in regional  import
volumes.
7the recessionary  period 1991-93,  when world GDP growth  averaged  only 1.1 percent (see
Table 1). The 3.7 average  world trade elasticity  in 1991-93  was even higher  than in 1994.
World trade  had experienced  negative  growth  in the previous  two  recessions,  negative
3.0 percent  in 1974-75  and negative 1 percent  in 1981-82. Have  we therefore  observed  a
decoupling  of world trade and output movements?
Table 1. World Trade Growth,  Output Growth,  and Trade Elastici Y5
3.7  6.1  4.1  8.7
3.2  3.3  1.1  2.9
1.2  1.8  3.7  3.0
a. Estimates  and  Forecast.
b. Growth  rate  of export  plus  import  volumes  of merchandise.
c. World  trade  elasticity  = growth  rate  of world  trade  / growth  rate  of  world  output.
Source:  International  Economics  Departnent,  World  Bank,  August  1995.
Three major factors worked in favor of sustaining trade growth in 1991-93: the
desynchronization of business cycles in the United States, Japan, and Europe; the
continuation and even acceleration of growth in the developing world, notably in East
Asia and Latin America which became the new growth poles; and the effective transfer of
purchasing power through a surge in private capital flows to highly absorbent LMIC
regions, namely East Asia and Latin America. 6
In contrast to the two previous business cycles, when the United States, Japan, and
Europe hit their cyclical troughs at about the same time, in 1975 and 1982-83, fluctuations
in activity in the three OECD regions in the early 1990s were desynchronized  to a
considerable extent.  The United States reached its peak in the last cycle in 1989 and a
trough in 1991, and has been in an upswing since then, while Europe and Japan reached
their respective peaks in 1990 and 1991 and did not reach troughs till 1994. In contrast to
the two previous cycles, when OECD countries were subject to common external
shocks-the  two oil price hikes-and  pursued similar policy responses, including sharp
monetary tightening, the last downturn in the industrial countries was inspired more by
forces internal to each country or region.  In the United States, these forces were
corporate balance sheet deterioration at the end of the 1980s and fiscal consolidation; in
Japan, the "bubble economy" in the second half of the 1980s and the subsequent collapse
in stock and property markets;  in Europe, the stimulus of German unification and the
subsequent monetary tightening needed to curb inflationary consequences.
5  Global  forecasts  are  created  using  BANK-GEM.  Long-term  forecasts  were created  in February  1995
for Global  Economic  Prospects  and the Developing  Countries  199S (GEP95).  Most recent  history  and
short-term  forecasts  were updated  in August 1995  for Global  Economic  Prospects  and the Developing
Countries  1995-Short-Term Update  (SecM95-969).  Forecasts  are subject  to future  revisions.
6  For income and regional  groupings  of economies,  see Appendix  A.
8Chart  6. Changes in G-3 Import Demand
Percent
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Desynchronized business cycles were reflected in a more stable pattern of overall
OECD import demand (charts 6 and 7), which grew on average by 1.8 percent a year in
1991-93, compared to declines of more than 11 percent in 1975 and 2.7 percent in
1981-82. Although the contribution of the OECD high-income countries to world import
growth fell to about 30 percent in 1991-93 from over 80 percent in 1986-90 (see Chart 8),
at least it was not sharply negative, as in the previous two recessions.  Europe provided a
floor for trade in 1990-199  1, when US and Japanese import growth was falling; then the
United States supported world import demand from  1992 onward, and Japan started to
contribute vigorously to imports in late 1993. In the last case, import growth has
rebounded even before the recovery of the economy as a result of yen appreciation and an
accelerated process of market deregulation.  The desynchronization of business and import
cycles in the OECD is likely to continue in the near term, although in a much more
attenuated way, with growth expected to gradually slow in the United States in 1995 and
1996 while it moves into higher gear in Europe (Chart 6).  Japan's import demand is
projected to expand at a robust rate in spite of its sluggish recovery (Chart 6), due to
continuous market opening triggered by appreciation of the yen and heightened consumer
awareness.'  Nevertheless, with import demand in all three OECD areas expanding
together in 1994-96, the OECD high income region's  contribution to world import
growth is expected to rise to over 60 percent, and this will be an important factor in the
projected surge in overall world trade growth to 8.7 percent a year in 1994-96.
7  See Appendix B, "Prospects for Japan's  Trade: Market Opening?"
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Another  factor in the recent  dynamism  of world trade has been  the new  role of the
developing  countries,  especially  in East Asia and Latin America. In 1991-93,  output
growth accelerated  in these  two regions  despite a slowdown  in the world  aggregate.  East
Asia's output grew by an average  of 8.7 percent a year in 1991-93,  accelerating  from
7.4 percent average  growth  in the preceding  decade. In Latin  America,  output  grew  an
average  of 3.2 percent  a year  during 1991-93,  accelerating  from 1.2 percent  average
growth in the 1  980s. In the same  period,  the rate of import growth  in the Low  and
Middle  Income  Countries  excluding  Developing  Europe, Central  Asia, and  the Former
Soviet Union (LMlCXs)  surged  to over 10.6  percent a year, from  just 2.2 percent  in the
preceding  decade.
Chart 8 shows  changing  shares  in contributions  to world import  volume  growth  by
income group. The LMIC  share  of contribution  increased  from less than  9 percent  in
1986-90  to almost  40 percent in 1991-93. Robust trade growth  in Hong Kong,
Singapore,  and Taiwan  accounted  for most of the surge in import  contribution  for non-
OECD  high income  countries,  which  increased  from 11 percent  in 1986-90  to almost
30 percent in 1991-93.  By contrast,  OECD's contribution  shrank  from over 80 percent to
31 percent across  the same  periods. The Former Soviet Union  (FSU)  made  a negative
contribution  of more than 14 percent  during 1991-93  (2 percent  negative  contribution
10during 1986-90). This means that, on average for  1991-93, 54 percent of the contribution
to the growth of world trade volume was generated by the LMICs, excluding FSU,
despite their share of less than 20 percent in total world trade in 1991. East Asia's and
Latin America's contributions were 29 percent and  17 percent, respectively. Despite the
projected OECD recovery, the OECD share of contribution is not expected to reach the
high levels observed in earlier business cycle recovery phases, reflecting the projected high
pace of LMIC trade integration.  In fact, OECD's  contribution to incremental world trade
growth will be limited to just over 60 percent, and LMICs will continue to claim about a
quarter of the growth in world import demand (of which more than half will accrue to
East Asia).  The increased role of LMICs in trade creation is likely to stay. 8
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Developing countries continued to grow and import during the last recession,
unlike in previous recessions, for at least three reasons.  First, buoyed by successful reform
and adjustment policies, domestic investment and consumption remained strong. Second,
despite the recession in OECD countries, export growth in developing countries actually
s  Prospects are discussed  in detail  in the following  sections.
11accelerated, rising, for the LMICX, to nearly 9 percent in 1991-93 from only 3.7 percent
in the preceding decade.
The nominal dollar direction of trade statistics compiled in Table 2 shows that
developing countries continued to grow exports to industrial countries, comprising
60 percent of their total exports, by 5-6 percent a year; but that intra-developing country
exports grew at twice that rate.  The share of intra-developing country trade in world
trade rose from 10 percent in 1990 to 13.3 percent in 1994. Within intra-LMIC trade, the
intra-Asia segment has been growing strongly since the 1970s. Intra-LAC trade, after
languishing for decades as a result of inward-oriented policies and the debt crisis, also
grew quickly, confumirng  the success of recent regional trade-opening initiatives such as
Mercosur.  The table also shows a collapse in intra-developing Europe trade as countries
of this region (including FSU) undertook reforms.  However, this trade segment has seen
over 50 percent growth in nominal terms in 1993, after averaging negative growth of
28 percent a year over the preceding 3 years, as many of the Eastern European economies
resumed growth. Further, trade between developing country regions, for example
between East Asia and Latin America, also strengthened (see lower panel in Table 2). The
emergence of developing countries as an autonomous influence in world trade is illustrated
by the fact that exports to developing countries-whether  from developing countries or
from industrial countries-accounted  for a major 3.3 percent of the 5.6 percent increase in
world export values in 1991-94 (2.8 percent out of a nominal 3 percent increase in
1991-93).
Finally, there was a surge of private capital flows to developing countries,
motivated in part by successful policy reforms and export success. Flows totaled
$325 billion during 1991-93 and an estimated additional $173 billion in 1994, and
provided, for the recipient countries, much more financing for imports than they were
able to use. During the oil price hikes of 1973-74 and 1979-80, purchasing power was
transferred to oil exporting countries through changes in terms of trade (and eventually
reached other LNIC regions, notably Latin America, in the form of private capital flows).
These transfers were translated into higher import demand by direct and indirect recipient
regions.  A surge in capital flows-targeted  to highly absorbent regions such as East Asia
and Latin America-has  been creating heightened import demand among  recipients in a
more direct manner, supporting the growth of world trade.
12Table 2.  Growth in Trade Segnments  & Conribution to World Trade Growth (Direction of Trade)
Shore  ir  World  Trade  (% of world  total)  Growth of Trade  Segmenas  (%)  Contrtwion  toWorld Trade Crowth (%)
WORLD  WORLD  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  23.3  19.0  0.3  12.8  5.6  233%  19.0%  0.3%  12.8%  5.6%
OECD  OECD  58.1  49.5  46.8  49.7  55.2  48.7  47.9  19.1  17.7  1.6  15.3  2.1  11.13  8.76  0.76  8.16  0.99
EU  EU  27.1  25.5  25.0  22.7  29.1  24.0  23.6  21.3  18.7  -1.5  18.8  0.6  6.04  4.82  -0.41  4.86  0.06
OECD  LDC  19.3  23.1  20.2  17.8  16.6  19.6  19.3  27.7  15.9  .2.1  11.3  9.5  5.28  3.37  -0.43  1.90  1.72
OECD  AFRICA  3.6  3.8  3.2  2.1  3.7  1.5  1.3  24.6  15.3  -7.3  7.4  -0.3  0.79  0.49  -0.21  0.13  -0.03
OECD  ASIA  5.3  5.2  5.4  6.3  7.2  9.2  9.4  23.0  20.1  3.6  15.8  13.0  31.7  3.02  0.21  1.06  3.06
OECD  MIDDLEEAST  2.2  5.0  4.6  3.7  23  2.5  2.1  45.3  16.9  -3.1  2.2  4.4  3.23  of84  -0.17  0.03  0.30
OECD  EUROPE  3.3  4.4  3.0  2.6  2.7  2.7  2.6  30.7  30.0  -2.6  14.2  5.2  1.07  0.37  -0.07  0.34  0.13
OECD  WESTERN  HEMESPHEI  4.8  4.6  4.1  3.1  2.8  3.7  3.8  22.7  16.3  -4.2  30.9  13.7  1.00  0.65  -0.39  0.32  0.44
LDC  OECD  14.1  16.3  202  19.0  36.9  17.8  18.1  30.3  24.6  -0.6  10.5  7.5  4.17  4.38  -0.15  1.71  1.29
AFRICA  OECD  3.1  3.3  2.3  2.5  37  1.4  1.3  26.4  14.1  2.2  5.1  -0.4  0.72  0.41  ao5  0.05  -0.01
ASIA  OECD  3.3  3.9  5.3  6.7  7.6  9.3  9.5  28.2  26.9  5.2  16.1  11.5  3.06  3.26  0.31  3.18  0.97
MIDDLEEAST  OECD  2.1  4.6  7.6  3.6  2.7  2.1  1.9  59.5  34.0  -13.0  9.2  -3.6  3.34  1.79  -0.79  0.14  -0.09
EUROPE  OECD  3.2  1.1  3.2  2.4  2.1  21  2.3  21.1  20.7  20.1  10.4  8.4  0.28  0.22  0.25  0.21  0.18
WESTERN  IIEMISPHEROECD  4.3  3.7  3.7  3.9  2.7  2.9  3.1  22.5  19.7  1.2  5.8  9.5  0.77  0.69  0.05  0.13  0.25
LDC  LDC  5.0  6.8  8.9  10.3  9.9  12.4  13.3  33.4  26.3  4.4  12.5  13.8  1.71  3.89  0.31  1.17  3.55
AFRICA  AFRICA  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  15.0  12.6  -0.3  13.9  8.6  0.05  0.02  0.00  0Q02  0.02
ASIA  ASIA  1.1  3.2  2.2  3.1  4.5  6.4  7.1  25.4  34.6  7.6  22.0  18.7  0.30  0.53  0.39  0.76  1.02
MIDDLEEAST  MIDDLEEAST  0.2  0.3  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.2  42.2  35.5  -2.9  12.2  -6.2  a08  0.11  -0.02  0.04  -0.02
EUROPE  EUROPE  3.5  1.5  1.6  2.2  3.0  0.9  1.4  22.2  21.7  8.4  -4.0  20.1  0.33  0.29  0.12  -0.05  0.17
WESTERNIHEMISPHERWESTERNIHEMISPHER  10  1.3  1.2  0.7  0.7  0.9  09.  33.8  22.3  -10.4  14.2  12.5  0.26  0.23  -0.11  G08  0.30
Asi's  South-South  Trad  Share  in World Trade  (% of world  total)  Growth  of Trade Segmnets  (%)  Coantibatlon  to  World Trial  Growth  (%)
-,  - <7ff.  <~1R79  4-33  .13Pt19l  e&X-.  S.  ;.  . .14j  6If7,  L  ,  7mWM  z  r  vnrtW
ASIA  LDC  1.61  3.92  3.25  4.33  5.55  7.91  8.49  28.2  32.4  6.4  39.0  17.5  0.47  0.78  ff23  0.87  3.18
ASIA  AFRICA  0.15  0.38  0.25  0.19  0.19  0.24  0.23  28.0  28.7  -4.9  15.8  11.6  0.04  0.05  -f.f0  0.03  0.02
ASIA  ASIA  1.12  3.19  2.17  3.08  4.45  6.45  7.09  25.4  34.6  7.6  22.0  18.7  0.30  0.53  0.39  0.76  102
ASIA  MIDDLE  EAST  0.16  0.32  0.50  0.53  0.36  0.53  0.48  48.1  30.0  2.7  4.9  33.7  0.08  0.12  0.01  0.02  006
ASIA  EUROPE  0.30  021  ff28  0.34  033  0.30  0.27  14.8  27.6  4.6  13.4  3.9  0.04  0.06  0.03  f003  0.00
ASIA  WESTERN  HEMISPHIE  0.06  0.14  0.22  0.19  0.21  0.39  0.43  50.4  30.8  10  16.0  26.8  0.04  0.05  -001  0.03  0.08
Import  of
LIC  ASIA  3.74  3.92  2.59  3.65  5.03  7.58  7.75  26.0  25.8  8.1  20.1  17.5  0.47  0.56  0.23  0.82  3.08
AFRICA  ASIA  0.25  0.39  0.13  0.14  017  0.26  0.24  16.7  11.2  9.0  16.8  17.6  0.04  0.02  f.00  ff02  0.03
ASIA  ASIA  1.35  3.21  3.81  2.67  4.11  6.28  6.53  25.4  28.4  8.7  22.9  18.4  ff31  0.40  ff39  ff72  ff94
MIDDLE  EAST  ASIA  0.16  ff31  0.41  ff41  0.33  ff47  ff46  42.6  26.0  1.4  7.6  14.9  ff08  f.10  0.00  f003  0.06
EUROPE  ASIA  0.10  ff10  0.32  0.34  0.33  0.30  ff21  23.7  24.1  30.8  12.5  -5.8  0.02  0.02  f4  ff04  4-.2
WEsFERN  HEMISPIERASIA  0.08  0.11  0.12  f.09  fo.f  0.28  0.31  38.8  23.4  4.3  14.1  40.5  f003  f002  ff00  f.f0  0.07
Note:  Picdasw  growib  rates  re caputed  usiailarithnietic  avagers.
Sauce: IMMiecda af  dTrode Satistica
13Chart 9 shows the relative magnitude of changes in terms of trade and long-term
capital inflows for LMIC as a whole.  On a gross basis (net aggregate resource flow, as
shown in Chart 3), capital flows have been a dominant force in the transfer of purchasing
power to developing countries, except for the periods of the OPEC oil price hikes.  On a
net basis (net aggregate transfer), however, dominance did not appear until the early
1990s due to a net resource outflow from the LMICs at the height of the debt crisis
(1982-87).  In both net and gross terms, the dominance is very pronounced as we observe
the effective end of debt crisis and a renewed, much larger surge in capital flows into the
LMICs.
Chart 9. Transfer of Purchasing Power to Developing Countries through
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Chart 10 shows contributions to world import volume growth by three  LMIC
regions, Asia, Latin America, and Middle East and North Africa. A surge in import
demand in the early 1990s is visible for Asia and Latin America. The movements in
import demand in these regions largely correspond to movements in output growth.
However, upon closer examination, the chart also reveals movements in import demand
14that are in line with transfer  of purchasing  power at critical  junctures. This should  be
regarded  as the third  major reason for sustained  import  demand  in certain  LMIC  regions.
Chart 10. Contribution  to World Import  Growth  by Major Recipients  of
Purchasing  Power  Transfer
Percent
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Source:  Intemational  Economics  Department,  World  Bank,  August  1995.
In the case of Middle  East and North Africa,  abrupt  changes  in contribution  to
world import  demand,  as shown in Chart 10,  correspond  to fluctuations  in oil prices  and
the resulting  transfer  of purchasing  power in the form of increased  (or decreased)  oil
revenue. In fact,  increased  demand  in oil exporting  countries  and circulation  of oil dollars
into Latin  America  and  Asia were the main causes  of sustained  import  demand  in LMICX,
as shown in Chart 7 for two periods  of oil price hikes. Among  other reasons  for the
sustained  import  demand,  purchasing  power  was transferred  away  from OECD  to these
regions.
For Latin America,  Chart 10 shows  surges in imports  in 1974-75  and 1980-81,
when oil dollars  complemented  increasing  amounts  of private  loans  to this  region.
Aggregate  net resource  flows to Latin  America  peaked  in 1980-8  1,  augmenting  the
region's import  capacity. Oil revenue rose for the region's oil exporting  countries
(Mexico,  Venezuela),  but import  demand  (import  capacity)  dropped  rapidly  in the wake  of
the 1982  debt  crisis. In fact, as showli  in Chart 11, during  the height  of the debt  crisis  in
151982-87, Latin America's contribution to world import demand was negative or barely
positive, as net long-term resource outflow (long-term aggregate resource transfer, net of
amortization, interest payments, and profit remittances) out of this region continued
during this period.  Chart 11 shows that a recent surge in Latin American imports again
coincided with the resurgence of private capital flow, this time consisting of private equity,
which accounted for a third of total net resource flow, and of foreign direct investment,
which also comprised a third of total flow, on average, for 1991-93. An average of
87 percent of total net resource flow into Latin America consisted of private flow during
this period. 9
In Asia, a surge in import demand (and import propensity) has been largely
sustained by regional trade integration, fueled by intra-regional foreign direct investments,
including from Japan.  In 1991-93, on average, foreign direct investment accounted for
about 45 percent of total capital inflow into East Asia (54 percent of private long-term
capital inflow), followed by private loans dominated by banks' export credits guaranteed
by official and private export credit institutions. Financial integration in the form of
increased private capital flow has been accelerating trade integration and creating
increased import demand in this region.
Granger causality tests between reserves positions and nominal import values
(goods and services) imply that import capacity tends to be strongly binding in Latin
America, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Europe and Central Asia (ECA); and
mildly binding in Middle East and North Africa. It is not likely to be a binding factor in
East Asian import demand (see Table 3).  One can easily assert that capacity has been a
critical factor in import demand in Europe and Central Asia (ECA) in the past several
years (and will continue to be so). The size of net long-term resource inflow is the strong
determinant of import demand for the regions with binding import capacities (see ECA in
Chart 11). By looking at recent movements in net resource flows to LMIC regions and
the contribution of these regions to world trade,  and by noting the aforementioned
aspects of East Asian capital flows, it becomes obvious that the recent surges in private
capital flows into these regions have supported high import demand out of these
regions.10
9  For capital  flow and import demand  growth  before and after Mexico's peso crisis (1994-95  and
beyond),  see Global  Economic  Prospects  and the Developing  Countries  1995-Short-Term Update,
August 1995,  where  this author provides  analyses  and projections.
10  Studies by Fry confirm  some of these  points  by noting that capital  flows to Latin  America  tended
to finance  existing  current account  deficits,  whereas  those into East Asia often  resulted  in increased
investments.  See  Maxwell  J. Fry,  "Foreign  direct  investment  in a macroeconomic  framnework:  finance,
efficiency,  incentives  and distortions,"  University  of Birmingham  International  Finance  Group
Working  Papers No. 92-17 (1992). Also see Fry, "Foreign  direct investment  in a macroeconomic
framework:  some further  findings," IFGWP-93-03  (1993).
16Table 3.  Granger Causality Test, 1970-1994:  Is Import Capacity Binding?
________________e  _______________  i-Statistic
Sub-SOPMAfIca^
Imports do not Granger-cause reserve positions  0.61  0.70
Reserve positions do not Granger-cause imports  3.12  0.(7b
Eas-t  Asi
Imports do not Granger-cause reserve positions  1.35  0.33
Reserve positions do not Granger-cause imports  0.54  0.74
S  o  sia
Imports do not Granger-cause reserve positions  5.28  0.02c
(up to 1992)  2.41  0.14
Reserve positions do not Granger-cause imports  4.03  0.03c
(up to 1992)  5.19  0.03c
;Eu  4aid  rewa  Asia>  >-  5s/  -;
Imports do not Granger-cause reserve positions  0.41  0.83
Reserve positions do not Granger-cause imports  2.63  0.09b
Mid&otast  AiidNorth Aff. 
Imports  do  not Granger-cause  reserve  positions  2.21  0.14
(up to 1992)  1.44  0.32
Reserve  positions  do not Granger-cause  imports  1.83  0.20
(up to 1992)  2.52  0.13
-La  fic  and the Caibbe4-
Imports  do not Granger-cause  reserve  positions  1.69  0.23
Reserve  positions  do not Granger-cause  imports  5.41  0.01'
Note: Sample period: 1970-1994; number of observations: 20; number of lags used: 5.
a.  Granger  causality  measures  precedence  and information  content, but does not by itself  indicate
causality  in the more  common  use  of the term. Y is said to be Granger-caused  by X if X helps in
the prediction  of Y, or equivalently,  if the coefficients  on the lagged Xs are statistically  significant
in the prediction  of Y with  the presence  of lagged Ys in the information  set. If F-statistic  exceeds  a
critical  level, at least one of the coefficients  attached  to lagged Xs is probably  non-zero,  suggesting
the existence  of Granger  causality. Normally,  a probability  lower than 0.05 is taken  as strong
evidence  of rejection  of the hypothesis  'X does not Granger-Cause  Y,' suggesting  that 'X does
Granger-Cause  Y.'
b.  Null  hypothesis  of 'X does not Granger-cause  Y' is rejected at 10 percent  confidence  level.
c.  Null  hypothesis  of 'X does not Granger-cause  Y' is rejected at 5 percent confidence  level.
17Chart 11. Trade Integration  and Transfer Purchasing  Power
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18Ill.  New Waves  of Liberalization  in the Mid 1980s  and the Early
1990s-Trend Acceleration  in Speed of Trade Integration?
The 1991 inaugural issue of the World Bank's  Global Economic Prospects and
the Developing Countries (GEP91) stated that:"
All through  the period 1950-90,  intemational trade grew faster than output. The
rapid growth  of world  trade in the 1950s and 1960s  was due partly to a recovery
from the stagnation  of the interwar years.  It was spurred  by buoyant  growth  in
industrial countries,  reduced barriers to trade, low world inflation,  modest  real
rates of interest, and expanding  real resource transfers to developing  countries.
But many of these  trends were reversed  in the 1970s and 1980s. The growth  of
international  trade slowed markedly and  the gap  with world output growth
narrowed... Progressive  liberalization  of trade policies between 1947 and 1974
helped.  Average tariffs in industrial countries fell from about 40 percent to
3 percent...  The  forces for trade liberalization  have weakened  since  the mid 1970s,
when industrial  countries  began to establish new barriers to trade.  By 1986,
almost 16 percent of OECD imports were covered by nontariff barriers... The
protectionist  trend  in developing  countries  has been similar. Analysis  of a sample
of 82 developing  countries  in 1987 revealed that 28 percent of all imports  were
subject  to nontariff  barriers...
Looking back, however, there was a marked acceleration in world integration
through trade again in the mid 1980s, as is highly visible in Chart 12. Measured by a ratio
of trade to output, this meant a reversal in the trend in trade integration for OECD, which
had been slowed by the macroeconomic instabilities and heightened nontariff barriers in
1970s and early 1980s. For LMIC as a whole, a rising trend in trade integration was a
rather new phenomenon. In fact, out of the 16 percent rise in LMICs' trade integration
ratio (trade/GDP) in the past three decades or so, a 15 percent surge was observed only
after the mid 1980s. A series of reform and liberalization efforts enabled LMIC to
vigorously take part in the world market.  Emerging LMIC markets, a decline in
commodity prices, a surge in foreign investment activities after the Plaza accord, and a
series of bilateral and regional trade arrangements such as an expansion of the EU and the
US-Canada free trade agreement, put OECD economies back on an accelerated
integration path.
l Global  Economic  Prospects  and the Developing  Countries  1991,  p. 9.
19Chart 12. Trade Integration
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Source:  International  Economnics  Department,  World Bank, February  1995.
20As GEP91 noted, a surge of protectionism occurred in the 1970s throughout the
world.  Even in East Asia, the only LMIC  region where a surge in trade could be detected
in the early 1970s, increasing protection was observed in number of economies, such as
Korea and Indonesia. 12 By contrast, the 1980s was the decade of trade liberalization,
often with complementary domestic policy reforms and a marked shift toward outward
orientation. Particularly from the mid 1980s until the early 1990s, an increasing number of
developing economies were liberalizing trade, mostly unilaterally. In Asia, liberalization
spread from Taiwan and Korea to Southeast Asia and on to China. In Latin America, it
spread from Chile to Mexico and beyond.'3 Chart 12 shows the reversal of falling or
stagnant trends in trade/output ratio for LMIC as a whole, and for East Asia and Latin
America in particular, corresponding to the liberalization drive.
The index of trade integration, computed as a ratio of exports plus imports to
GDP, is one of an array of indicators used to represent trade liberalization or,
synonymously, outward orientation.  Other aggregate indicators include the effective
exchange rate (for exports vs. imports); Dollar index and its variations; ordinal and
subjective rankings of liberalization, comprising a group of individual indicators; and
Leamer's index. 14 Dean, Desai, and Riedel further categorize outward orientation into a
move toward neutrality, liberality, or openness.'5 A move toward neutrality involves
equalizing incentives between the exporting and import-competing sectors.  Since a
majority of developing economies were driven by import substitution until the 1980s, this
generally meant a reduction in the anti-export bias.  A move toward liberality can be
fostered by cutting policy interventions; however, a more neutral regime does not
necessarily mean a more liberal one, since neutrality can be achieved by introducing
neutralizing intervention, i.e., export subsidies against import barriers. Finally, openness is
simply equated with an increase in the share of trade to GDP.
Since different measures tend to concentrate on distinct aspects of liberalization,
none can be perfect, nor even compatible with every kind of study or assessment of trade
regimes.  The trade/GDP ratio is no exception, and has its own share of drawbacks.  First,
it can conceal various degrees of distortion, and therefore the same trade/output share can
coexist with a range of neutrality and liberality.  Second, this share of trade to output has a
relatively strong association with the size of the economy.  For instance, measured in real
terms, the US economy showed an average merchandise trade/GDP ratio of 18 percent for
1991-93, while China's ratio averaged over 30 percent for the same period. Is the Chinese
economy more open than the US economy?  The answer is definitely not.  The US
12  See, for example, Amar Bhattacharya and Johannes F. Linn, "Trade and Industrial Policies in the
Developing Countries of East Asia," World Bank Discussion Paper No. 27, 1988.
3 Judith M. Dean, Seema Desai, and James Riedel, "Trade Policy Reform in Developing Countries since
1985: A Review of the Evidence," World Bank Discussion Paper No. 267,  1994, p. 1.
For the design and sequencing of trade reform, and for documented reform efforts up to the mid 1980s,
see Vinod Thomas, J. Nash and Associates,  Best Practices in Trade Policy Reform, Oxford University
Press, 1991; and Michael Michaely, Armeane M. Choksi, and Demetris Papageorgiou, Liberalizing
Foreign  Trade:  Lessons  of Experience  in the Developing  World,  Basil  Blackwell,  1991.
14 For brief description of these indices and references, see  Dean, Desai, and Riedel, Sec. II.
15 Ibid., p. 3.
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fiheconomy is 11 times larger than China's,16 and cross-country comparison shows a strong
negative correlation between trade/GDP ratio and the size of an economy.
Some argue against using the trade/output ratio to measure global integration for
economies with accumulated FDI stock abroad.  Critics assert that a reduction of exports
of the affected industry at the source country, and the resulting decline in export/GDP
ratio, should not be seen as a decay in globalization.  As defined at the outset of the paper,
globalization is a process of integrating production, distribution, and usage of goods and
services among the economies of the world, which shifts the stock of productive capacity
across the national boundaries, notably in the form of accumulated FDI.  The share of
trade/GDP tends to increase in both supplier and recipient countries as inter-industry trade
increases in the earlier stages of this process. At a later stage, in the move toward overseas
production (even with a rise in accommodating imports in the affected product category),
the trade/GDP share of the original capital sourcing country declines as domestic content
of products increases. Components are supplied increasingly in the FDI destination, or
even by cost-competitive third party economies, and spot marketing or marketing in a
group of third party economies increases (this might be high from the outset for overseas
production).  However, for affected countries as a group, or at a world aggregate level,
this accumulation of FDI stock almost surely increases trade/output ratio.'7
Harrison examined correlations between seven proxies, including the
aforementioned aggregate measures of trade/GDP share, and individual measures such as
the black market exchange rate premium.'8 Although she found that correlations across
openness (by her definition) measures were sometimes weak, trade/GDP share was
positively correlated with ordinal and subjective ranking measures of trade reform, and
negatively correlated with measures of price distortions, including black market pre  miums,
where higher numbers mean an inappropriately high official exchange rate. The results
confirm that although the trade/output ratio contains its own share of drawbacks, it can,
with suitable size adjustments, be a simple, comprehensive, and stable measure of the
openness used in time series observations or in cross-country observations.' 9 Speed of
16  Even  if the size of the domestic market  is compared  using purchasing  power  parity  (PPP)
conversion  factors,  the US economy was at least three times larger  than China's in 1992. This implies
an enlargement  of the denominator  in the trade/output  ratio. South  Korea's trade/output  ratio was
67 percent on average  for 1991-93. Malaysia's ratio was 141  percent. Are these economies  more  open
than the US economy? As economies  develop,  the share of the nontradable  service  sector in total
output tends  to increase. This is one major  cause of the negative  correlation.
One can always  argue the difference  of globalizing  and globalized;  that is; globalization  defined
as a process of integration.  Trade activities  often  increase between  source  and destination  economies
in the ongoing  process  of FDI. For observed  cases of FDI-trade  interaction,  see, for example,  Kenji
Takeuchi,  "Does  Japanese  Direct  Foreign Investment  Promote Japanese  Imports  from Developing
Countries?"  World  Bank Policy  Research  Working  Paper  No. 458, 1990.
18  Ann Harrison,  "Openness  and Growth,"  World  Bank Policy Research  Working  Paper No. 809,
1991.
19  For instance,  Syrquin  and Chenery used the deviation  of actual  from predicted  trade flows,  with
predictions  based  on variables  such as country  size. See Moshe Syrquin  and Hollis  Chenery, "Three
Decades  of Industrialization,"  in The World  Bank Economic  Review,  Vol. 3. No. 2, 1989.
22
_  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  Atrade integration, as the first order approximation of the rate of change in trade/GDP ratio,
therefore represents the pace of opening, or, in a general sense, of liberalization. 20
Table 4 shows the wave of unilateral liberalization that emerged from the mid
1980s to the early 1990s in developing regions, and the resulting upward kinks in the
trends in trade/GDP ratios for the majority of countries and regions that enacted
liberalization measures (shown in the last column). 21  With a few exceptions where
business cycle elements and/or specific political incidents overshadowed the reform efforts
(e.g., China), trend acceleration-or  a reversal, in the case of a falling trend-in  the
trade/output ratio was attained as a result of liberalization measures.  As shown in Chart
12, this dramatic turnaround in the reforming countries seems to have created a marked
evolution in their degree of involvement in the mid 1980s.
A sample  ranking  of countries  by openness  is shown in Appendix C, where  PPP evaluations  of output
size and the second  round  of size adjustment  are presented.
20  Trade/output  ratio has variables  that  tend to grow geometrically  in both numerator  and
denominator. As a result, this ratio tends to have a linear (not log-linear)  trend, with  kinks. In the
cross-country/cross-region  comparison,  if the slope of the trend line is similar,  one that  starts with  a
higher trade/output  ratio has a slower  speed of integration. This is an important  technical  fact  in
understanding  regional  differences  in the speed of integration  (see forecast  portions  of Chart 12  and
Table 5).
21  For a further quantitative  and qualitative  evaluation  of these liberalization  efforts,  see Shigeru
Otsubo,  "Determinants  of Trade  Integration:  Structural  Integrators vs. Contingent  Integrators?"  Mimeo,
International  Economics  Department,  World  Bank, 1995.
23Table  4.  Iteprese.itative  Trrade Reforinis  in Developing Countries silice the Mid 1980s
Avei age  Taiff  Rates  (%A.I  Oaantitative Rctictipirs  Black Market Pcniiuiiti  Real Fffective  Exchanee  Rate'  TrendinImVsrVGDPrato  Trndin  Ex 1 f,rus/GDPrakio'  TrcndiaTiadc/QDPratio'
Year  Yearof
Region/Country  Began Major  Pre refonm  Post-  nfunn  Pre-refoin  Post-reformt Pre-refonn' Post-refonn  I st year  of  IJp to 1992  Pee-reform  Post-reform  Pie-refomi  Pos-trefonn  Pre-refofm  Post-reform
Refomr  major  reform
South Asia
Bangladesh  1985  1991  94.0(E89)  50.0(S93)  39.5 (89)  10.0('93)  113.0  112.8  -5.3  -5.3  5.1  2.3  3.3  12.2  4.6  5.7
India  1988  1991  128.0  ('90)  71.0(93)  93.0('90)  <50.0 ('93)  12.4  23.8  -7.7  -7.7  0.5  6.7  -1.1  6.9  -0.1  6.8
Pakistan  1987  1987  68.9(S87)  64.8(90)  63.0('80)  32.7('86)  19.6  7.7  -2.3  -11.7  -3.7  -0.7  -1.0  4.7  -2.8  1.6
Si Ilanka  1987  1987  31.0 ( 85)  25.0(S92)  a few ('85)  0. ()92)  15.2  18.9  -2.0  -().5  -1.9  1.5  109  2.9  -1.5  2.1
East Asia
China  1984  1984  38.1(86)  43.0(92)  70.0('92)  20.0  88.0  -11.3  -43.9  1.3  -2.4  1.0  1.7  1.2  -0.7
Indonesia  1985  1986  27.0(85)  22.0(90)  32.0('85)  100(90)  7.6  8.9  -18.4  -23.2  -3.3  1.3  -5.6  4.2  -4.6  2.9
Korea  1984  1987  24.0('84)  10.1(92)  23.0('84)  <5.0('92)  4.1  3.0  8.8  13.1  -3.9  3.7  -2.1  2.1  -3.0  2.9
Malaysia  1986  1991  14.0(S93)  <5.0('85)  <5.0('92)  0.9  0.0  4.6  4.6  -2.2  11.5  2.3  7.3  0.2  9.1
Philippines  1985  1986  27.6(85)  24.3(92)  100.0('83)  <5.0('92)  11.0  4.6  -6.1  1.8  -2.9  12.1  1.0  6.8  -1.2  9.7
Thadand  1982  1989  13.0('86)  11.4('90)  <5.0('85)  <5.0('88)  -0.9  1.2  0.6  -0.5  -2.3  8.6  2.8  7.2  -0.1  7.9
Latin  America
Argentina  1987  1989  29.4(88)  12.2(92)  88.0('88)  afew('92)  39.7  21.2  16.3  43.7  -1.7  25.1  0.0  0.5  -0.6  10.0
Brazld  19861987/8  510(87)  21.0(92)  39.0('87)  mninisal('92)  43.8  51.7  5.4  9.5  -6.4  9.3  3.8  3.9  -1.5  6.1
Chile  1985  1985  35.0('84)  11.0(91) minimal('84)  0.0(91)  16.3  16.1  -11.0  -14.5  -0.2  3.2  0.6  -0.8  03  1.2
Colombia  1985  1985  61.0('84)  12.0(92)  99.0('84)  10('92)  8.6  12.9  -23.9  -36.1  0.3  9.8  2.2  8.7  1.1  92
Mexico  1985  1985  29.0('85)  10.0('87)  92.2('85)  19.9('90)  14.5  10.3  -26.2  3.7  6.1  13.0  11.4  4.9  8.6  8.8
Penu  1989  1989  57.0(88)  17.0(92)  100.0('88)  OD('92)  82.4  11.5  54.1  1('6.7  -6.9  11.1  -8.4  4.7  -7.6  7.6
VenezueLa  1989  1989  37.0(89)  19.0(S91'  40.0('89)  10.0(SI)  103.0  5.2  -5.2  0.2  0.8  2.2  -3.5  6.2  -1.5  4.7
Stib-Saharan  Africa
Ghana  1986  1986  30.0(83)  17.0(91)  au(?)  2.0(7)  984.6  16.5  -7.0  -11.1  -4.5  5.9  -3.7  -0.3  -4.1  2.9
Kenya  1988  1988  40.0('87)  34.0(9I)  71.0('87)  0.2 (91)  16.3  8.8  -1.3  -5.4  -1.4  -6.0  -2.0  -0.6  -1.6  -3.9
Madagascar  1987  1987  46.0('88)  36.0(90)  al('86)  OD('90)  37.4  13.0  -7.7  -11.2  -5.9  -2.2  2.7  3.1  -1.7  0.1
Malawi  1988  1988  25.5(86)  a_('86)  few('91)  50.7  12.1  52  4.5  3.7  -1.7  -1.7  -2.7  0.6  -2.3
Nigeria  1986  1986  35.0(84)  32.7(90)  aU('
8 4)  17.0('88)  209.7  27.4  -62.3  -71.2  -19.5  2.9  -9.2  1.2  -13.7  1.8
Tanzania  1984  1984  30.0(86)  33.0(92)  nearlyall(?)  100.0('92)  241.8  118.7  28.8  -145.2  -3.3  -2.2  -6.2  -1.3  -4.3  -1.9
Zaire  1983  1986  23.8(84)  24.7(90)  103.0('84)  100.0('90)  71.1  9.4  -5.6  -13.1  -5.0  -2.4  -2.2  -0.2  -3.5  -1.2
a. The exchange  rate premium  is calculated as  ((black market  rate - official rate) / official  rate) '  100.
b.  Before and  after the  year of major reform.
c.  Rate  of change.  A negative  sigin indicaes depreciation.
d.  Post-reform:  average  rate  of chiange  froims  year  of rel'ormt  to 1994  (1993 for Sub-Saluarwut  Africa).
Pre-reform : average  rate of change  for the  equivalent timespan  before reforilt.
Source: J.M. Dean,  Seeina  Desai, anid  Jaittes  Riedel, "Tradc Policy Reforn  in Dcvelopinsg  Couittries since 1985:  A Review of the Evidece,"  various tables.
Intemalional Monelary Fund, Issues  and Developnents  in Internationmnl  Trade Po(icv,  1992.  Tables II  and 12.
Author's own conmpilation  from the World Bank DEC Analytical Database.
24Table 5.  World Trade Growth, Output Growth, and Speed of Integration
1"11-(d  1')0  Jo  I  MWJ(O-1(  NQ[_91J  I')');  '(,
World  TIade&Growthb  7.7  3.7  6.1  4.1  8.7
World  Output Growth  5.2  3.2  3.3  1.1  2.9
Speed  of Integration  2.6  0.6  2.8  3.0  5.8
Higb-Income  OECD  3.3  0.7  3.2  1.1  5.4
UnitedcStates  3.1  1.9  4.0  4.2  6.9
Japan'  4.6  1.5  0.9  -1.7  4.7
EU12  3.6  0.6  3.7  0.7  4.8
LMIC  0.3  -0.6  0.7  6.4  5.6
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -0.9  -1.5  -0.7  0.7  0.7
EastAsias  -0.5  1.3  1.4  5.7  6.1
South Asia  -0.8  -0.4  -0.4  4.4  4.4
ECA  3.0  0.0  -1.9  6.2  9.7
.Europe  3.8  0.4  0.8  5.8  5.2
.- FSU  1.7  -0.2  -5.0  -0.9  13.6
- MEiNrA  < - -0.5  -1.5  3.1  1.2  0.0
LatirLA6merica  -0.4  -1.6  1.9  9.5  2.6
- .LMICl:X  ~~  - -0.4  -0.7  1.9  5.4  4.2
a. Estimates  and Forecast.
b. Growth  rate  of export  plus  import  volumes  of merchandise  except  for 1961-70.  For  1961-70,  national
accounts  data  for trade  in goods  and  services  are  used.
c. Speed  of integration  = growth  rate  of world  trade  -growth  rate  of world  output.
What happened in the early 1990s, often characterized as trade-output decoupling,
was an enormous acceleration in the speed of LMIC trade integration into the world
market, which compensated for a deceleration in trade integration among OECD, where
integration is highly pro-cyclical. Table 5 shows that between two adjacent periods of
smooth world output expansion (1986-90) and OECD recession (1991-93), world
aggregate speed of trade integration was in fact kept, on average, at a constant level.
However, the movements in different income groups were startlingly dissimilar. LMICs
have seen tremendous acceleration in the speed of trade integration, from a slow pace of
0.7 percent a year to a galloping 6.4 percent a year, while OECD's pace of integration
decelerated from over 3 percent a year to 1.1 percent a year in the latter half of the 1980s.
Supported by a strong recovery in Europe, accelerated market opening  in Japan, 22
and continued robust demand in the United States and developing countries, world trade
should continue to grow at a robust rate of 8-9 percent for 1994-96. LMIC's speed of
trade integration will continue to be strong in the near term.  The only noticeable
slowdown in the pace of trade integration should be observed in LAC, where countries are
forced to grapple with a problem of mounting current account deficit as a result of strong
import growth during 1991-93, financed largely by a surge in capital inflow. The unstable
nature of unbalanced trade integration, which accumulates the mounting and unsustainable
level of current account deficit, was manifested in the recent Mexican peso crisis.
22  See  Appendix  C for  details.
25In the longer run (after 1997), the world's  speed of integration will eventually
slow, after evolving through a business cycle.  Trade dependency indicators are fairly pro-
cyclical variables.  However, the speed of integration should stay at around the level
observed after the mid 1980s (2.8 percent), which will be conducive to a continued robust
world trade growth of over 6 percent a year, on average,  for the next 5-10 years.  The
underlying forces will be the emergence of the growth poles in LMIC, sustained  capital
flow and resulting financial integration, market openings (both autonomous and GATT
related), and the ongoing structural adjustments that will continue to desynchronize
OECD business cycles in the medium term. The direction of trade statistics in Table 2
also imply prospects for robust growth in intra-regional trade in East Asia and Latin
America; for a surge in East Asia-Latin America trade; for Eastern Europe and FSU
reentering the world markets, which should particularly benefit trade between OECD
Europe and Eastern Europe and FSU; and for stronger pulls on OECD countries from
these LMIC regions in general. 23 In the medium to long term, trade between OECD and
LMIC (in both directions) and trade among LMICs will continue to be substantial driving
forces in world trade, despite the projected recovery in intra-OECD trade. The
liberalization drive, which has put some LMIC countries on an faster trade integration
path and a faster output growth path since the mid 1980s, could fortify its virtuous cycle if
supported by compatible and complementary reforms in domestic markets.
Chart 12 shows the likely developments in trade/output ratios. 24 A successful
completion of GATT Uruguay Round sets the underlying pace of integration throughout
the world in the coming derade.  Since the gains from the Round should be felt most
strongly in EU, the United States, and Japan, where distortions have been high and more
concentrated, a high pace of trade integration is projected for OECD. The US economy,
situated at a crossroads of new outward-oriented North-South trade and investment
arrangements (NAFTA and APEC), should keep a relatively high speed of integration by
its historical standard. Although the speed of trade integration slows as the trade/output
ratio increases for the technical reason explained above,25 the ratio should increase from
less than 18 percent in 1991-93 to over 25 percent during the next decade.
Japan, after more than two decades of a stagnant trade/GDP ratio, should
accelerate its integration in the coming decade.  Japan had a high pace of trade integration
from the end of World War II until the first oil crisis in the early 1970s (SOI of 4.6 for the
1960s). Contrary to the high speed of integration in the early years, which was attained
largely by the drive toward exports, the projected acceleration of Japan's speed of
integration will be brought about by its market opening, or drive toward imports.
Accelerated market deregulation and heightened consumer awareness of the lower cost of
23  For historical  trend  and prospects  in South-South  trade and trade regionalization,  see Shigeru
Otsubo and Tetsuo  Umemura,  "Regionalization  and South-South  Trade: could it be an entry  point  for
the South  toward  global  integration?"  Policy  Research  Working Paper (forthcoming),  World  Bank,
1996.
24  Global  forecasts  are created  using  BANK-GEM.  Long-term forecasts  are from  February  1995,
and are subjective  to future  revisions.
2's  See footnote  20.
26imports  will support  this import expansion. 26 Furthermore,  as Japan's supply  of long-term
capital,  in the form of FDI, revives  with the end of current  prolonged  recession,  inter-
industry  trade associated  with a shift toward  overseas  production  (in Asia in particular)
will increase  dramatically  in both directions  in the coming  decade. The drive  for this is
expected  to come,  this time, from medium and small enterprises,  in addition  to the large
ones.
The trade/GDP  ratio of the original  EU  12 economies  is at around  50 percent  in
1995. EU's degree  of trade integration  over the long term should  stay at a high level.
Expansion  of EU and  the deepening  of the Common  Market  will be the underlying  factor.
Although  the increased  presence  of LMIC  regions in world trade will  be
indisputable,  prospects  for trade integration  differ by region and  between  successful
integrators  and unsuccessful  ones. East Asia's measured  pace of trade integration  will
decline  as trade/output  ratio increases  from the level observed  in the first half of 1990.
This will happen  for two  reasons. First, a boom in demand for  East Asian  exports  will
eventually  come to an end as growth in North American  and Japanese  import  demand
decreases  with business  cycle  movements  and as import  penetration  increases  to a
saturation  level. Second,  after several  years of rapid expansion  in exports  and  domestic
demand,  the medium-term  supply  capacity  of these econormies  will become  more  and more
of a binding  factor. However,  measured  in trade/output  ratio, this represents  a
continuation  of a long-term  trend, supported  by further  liberalization  initiatives.  Eastern
Europe's imports  should  grow strongly  in the near term, supported  by a surge  in capital
inflow. EU's recovery  should bring  real positive results  in Eastern  Europe's export
growth  through  the Association  Agreements. Further trade  integration  with EU through
the Association  Agreements,  and strengthened  foreign  direct  investments  (as in Japan-East
Asia),  are major underlying  factors  for the relatively  high speed  of integration  for the next
decade. Latin America's  pace of trade integration  into the world market will be forced  to
slow further  as its import  growth needs  to be more in line with export growth  for
successful  and stable integration  over the longer term. Provided  that the region's
economies  follow  prudent  macroeconomic  management  to secure  new capital  inflow,
however,  Latin America  is expected  to preserve  a relatively  high pace of integration.  The
positive  effects  of the new reform  initiatives  will show up in efficiency  gains  that  augment
export competitiveness,  and the region's outward-oriented  South-South  and  North-South
Regional  Trade Arrangements  (RTAs)  will add to the integration  process.
LMIC's long-run  speed of integration  for the next  decade, although  slower  than
the pace  produced  by the desynchronized  business  cycles  of OECD  and LMIC  in the early
1990s,  should  represent  a marked acceleration  from the pace experienced  in 1980s  after
the wave  of trade liberalization  (0.7  percent in 1986-90). If compared  to the pace  before
the mid 1980s  (SOI of 0.3 percent for 1961-70,  and negative  0.6 percent  during 1971-85),
the acceleration  in the pace of trade  interdependence  seems  even more  remarkable.
Compared  to historical  performance,  the action  lies in LMIC, and  this will continue  in the
coming  decade.
26  See Appendix  C for details.
27IV.  Balanced vs. Unbalanced Integration
Table  4 shows  preconditions,  liberalization,  and end results of trade  reformns  for 24
major reformners  from the mid 1980s  to the early 1990s. 27 Trade liberalization  during  this
period encompassed  not only a reduction  in the anti-export  bias of the trade regime  and an
increased  reliance  on price mechanisms,  but also a reduced  level of intervention.
After  evaluating  reform  episodes  up to the mid 1980s,  Thomas and Nash,  and
Michaely,  Papageorgiou,  and Choksi  argued  that macroeconomic  stability  and restraint  of
inflation  have  been critical  factors  in the success  of trade reform. 28 Their  studies  also
suggested  that countries  that have  been most successful  in implementing  reform  have  first
transformed  quantitative  restrictions  (QRs)  into tariffs, and then gradually  lowered  these
tariffs and made them uniform. Further,  they suggested  that direct incentives  to exports
have not been as important  to export growth  as real devaluation  and import  liberalization,
and at the same time,  that exporters' access  to imported  inputs has been  more important
for export growth  than  have general  export subsidies. There is also general  consensus  that
the success  of trade reform  will be limited  if it is not accompanied  by removal  of domestic
distortions. The importance  of sustained  real devaluation  for the success  of reform  for
countries  with overvalued  currencies  has been  repeatedly  stressed in many  studies.
Removal  of import  restrictions  under  foreign  exchange  shortage  due to overvalued  rates
and tight  exchange  controls  is ineffective. Bearing  these arguments  in mind,  Table  4
shows  changes  in average  tariff  rates, quantitative  restrictions,  the average  black  market
premium,  9 and real  effective  exchange  rates before and after  the reform. Trade
integration  (openness)  indices,  both aggregate  and by exports and imports,  measure  the
end results  of the reform. Regional  charts (charts  13-15)  in the following  sections
demonstrate  the existence  of anti-export  bias (by the movements  in real  effective  exchange
rates) and balance  of the trade reforms  (in relative  movements  in export  and import
integration  before and after  the major  reform  initiatives).  30
In the mid 1980s,  all four South Asian countries  still  protected  their import-
competing  sectors  with very high tariffs. Between 1985  and 1990, with the exception  of
Sri Lanka,  the pattern  of reform  in this region was one of moving  toward  a more  neutral
27 This table is based, among  other  sources,  on various  tables  in Dean, Desai, and  Riedel,  "Trade  Policy
Reform  in Developing  Countries  since 1985:  A Review  of the Evidence." General  descriptions  of
reforms  for each region  in this section  also owe a great deal to this review.
23  Vinod  Thomas,  J. Nash  and Associates,  Best Practices  in Trade Policy Reform;  and Michael
Michaely,  Armeane  M. Choksi,  and Demetris  Papageorgiou,  Liberalizing  Foreign Trade:  Lessons  of
Experience  in the Developing  World, 1991.
29 As a measure  of price distortions  and foreign exchange  controls, a larger black market  foreign
exchange  premium  means a higher  degree of anti-export  bias.
30 Charts 13-16  show the balance  between  export and import integration  by presenting  trend  rates  of
changes  in export/GDP  ratio and import/GDP  ratio before and after the year of major  reform  (see
Table  4). If the economy  is skewed  in the direction  of import integration-often associated  with
appreciation  in real effective  exchange  rate-it  tends to have balance  of payment  difficulties  (e.g.,
Mexico).
28trading  regime. Sri Lanka,  having  been  essentially  free of QRs before the mid 1980s,
moved  towards  liberality  by reducing  tariffs and export disincentives  at the same  time.
Since 1991,  India and  Bangladesh  have  moved  toward  liberality  with radical  reforms  in
foreign  exchange  markets. Average  tariff  rates, although  still  high compared  to those of
Chart 13
Trade  Integration  Before  and After  the Trade  Policy  Reform  of the 1980s
(South  Asia)
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other regions, were reduced an average of 30 percent.  QRs were reduced, on average, to
less than half of the pre-reforrn levels.  Although price distortions and foreign exchange
29shortages, measured in black market premia, did not improve much-which  has limited
the effects of import liberalization-the  economies of South Asia succeeded in attaining a
sustained real depreciation. The reforms in this region, although generally modest, as
portrayed in Chart 13, have resulted in a balanced acceleration in trade integration
(openness) as the trend acceleration has been brought out by both exports and imports.
Most of the East Asian economies had already undertaken trade liberalization
initiatives by the mid 1980s. Korea and Malaysia had removed most quantitative
restrictions and were in the middle of more comprehensive trade reform.  China's Open
Door policy, initiated in 1978, started to produce higher export and output growth by the
late 1980s. As Dean, Desai, and Riedel have noted, the first phase of trade policy reform
in East Asia was removing obstacles to exporting, which typically involved unifying and
devaluing the exchange rate and eliminating quantitative restrictions on imports of
intermediate and capital goods. The second phase, in which tariffs began to be gradually
reduced, generally commenced only after the balance of payments was strengthened. 3'
Chart 14 shows the patterns of trade integration observed in East Asia since the
mid 1980s. China has been promoting exports while maintaining tight control on imports,
through both high rate of tariffs and extensive use of quantitative restrictions, and did not
embark on the second phase of trade policy reforms until the early 1990s. China,
Indonesia, and the Philippines initiated reform with substantial real depreciation, but only
China and Indonesia sustained and even enlarged the level of devaluation. The Philippines
experienced real appreciation from the year of reform until 1992. Indonesia succeeded in
trade integration in both exports and imports during the adjustment process. The
Philippines also experienced higher trade integration through expansion of both sides;
however, import growth overtook export growth due to real appreciation, which resulted
in persistent balance of payments problems. China's  trend trade integration rate actually
slowed due to excessively export-oriented reforms that included establishing special
economic zones for promoting exports.  China's  trade integration up to 1992, on average,
had been unbalanced. 32 However, with the projected membership in the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and with complementary domestic reforms proceeding at a rapid
pace, China's trade reform seems to have recently entered the second phase, where import
restrictions will be gradually reduced. The effects of reduced import restrictions have
been reinforced with the unification of the exchange rate in early 1994. In fact, China's
speed of trade integration was a strong positive 7.8 percent, on average, for 1991-93,
emerging from a negative 6.3 percent during 1986-90. Supported by a buoyant domestic
economy, China's imports grew at over 26 percent a year, on average, during 1991-93 (as
opposed to falling 5 percent a year, on average, in 1986-90).
31  Dean,  Desai, and Riedel,  p. 86.
32  Negative  average  import  growth  during  the latter half of the 1980s  was in fact brought  about  by
stringent  import control  under economic  austerity  programs  during 1986  and 1989-90.
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In Latin  America,  reform  involved  simultaneous  moves  toward  neutrality  and
liberality. Liberalization  reduced  both import/export  impediments  (tariff  rates  and
quantitative  restrictions)  and  restrictions  on foreign  exchange  markets. Reforms  in Chile,
Columbia,  and Mexico-the early reformers-were  characterized  by initial  efforts  to
devalue  their currencies.  Argentina,  Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela-the late  reformers-
31had a higher  degree  of anti-export  bias and distortions  manifested  in higher  black  market
premia before  the reform.  The premia  were successfully  reduced  in these  economies,
except  in Brazil,  where  galloping  inflation  undermined  the reform  efforts. All seven  Latin
American  reformers  listed  in Table  4 generally  achieved a higher  pace of trade  integration
and market  openness.  In Chart 15,  the unbalanced  import-dominant  integration  is
particularly  visible  for Argentina,  Brazil,  and Mexico. Dominance  of import  growth  is
also evident  for Peru. In Mexico,  the aggregate  trend rate of trade integration  was fairly
constant  before and after  the reform. However,  the components  shifted  drastically  during
the reform, with import growth overtaking export growth as the cause of overall trade
integration. Mexico initially succeeded in depreciating the real effective exchange rate
(26.2 percent depreciation between 1985 and 1986).  However, the currency began to
appreciate after it was pegged to the US dollar, as foreign capital inflow revived and
nominal depreciation lagged behind the rate of inflation, producing a net appreciation of
3.7 percent up to 1992. Edwards warns that liberalization of the capital account prior to
liberalization of the current account could provoke capital inflow if domestic financial
reforms have occurred. 33 This could lead to exchange rate appreciation, undermining the
efforts to reduce anti-export  bias.  Indeed, in Mexico, appreciation in real exchange rate
brought out an unbalanced integration. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru all share, by
and large, the risk of unbalanced trade integration, since none of these countries has
succeeded in effectively removing anti-export bias in their reform packages (see Chart 4,
lower right quadrangle). In Chile, the trend in export/GDP ratio turned slightly positive in
1991-93, as opposed to negative 0.9 percent in 1986-90.  Nogues and Gulati have argued
that although Chile's export success is still limited in scope, that success has been due to
the openness of its irnport  regime and significant real devaluation of the currency. 34 Dean,
Desai, and Riedel have also noted Chile's commitment to avoiding real appreciation and
maintaining stability in the real exchange rate, to preserve the competitiveness of the
export sector. 35 As in Mexico, large capital inflows had put pressure to appreciate on the
Chilean peso.  Although the inflows appear to be largely foreign direct investment-in
fact, FDI share in private capital flow was 43 percent,  on average, during 1991-93,  well
over the Latin American average of 38 percent, and in sharp contrast to 33 percent in
Mexico-the  government has attempted to stem the short-run inflows to avoid
revaluation.  With these prudent reform measures, Chile's export growth accelerated from
5.6 percent a year, on average, during 1986-90 to 7.5 percent a year for 1991-93. It is
expected to accelerate further, to 8.3 percent a year during OECD recoveries in 1994-96.
Chile's output growth, which accelerated from 2.2 percent a year in 1971-85 to
6.5 percent a year in 1986-90 to 7.4 percent a year during  1991-93, is projected to
stabilize in the 5-6 percent range in the coming decade.  In terns  of Chart 4, Chile is
projected to move into the upper right quadrangle, joining  the group of successful trade
integrators.
33 Sebastian  Edwards,  "The  Sequencing  of Economic  Reform: Analytical  Issues  and  Lessons  from Latin
American  Experiences,"  World  Economy,  Vol. 13, 1990.
3  Julio Nogues  and S. Gulati,  "Economic  Policies and Performance  under  Alternative  Trade  Regimes:
Latin America  during  the 80s," World  Bank Latin America and Caribbean  Technical  Department
Regional  Studies  Program,  Report  No. 16, 1992.
3  Dean, Desai,  and Riedel,  p. 64.
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100  - - - - - - - - - - - - 33quantitative restrictions covering virtually all categories, and by high tariff rates that were
probably largely redundant due to high nontariff barriers.  All countries presented in Table
4 (all non-CFA members), particularly Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania, initiated their reform
by  attempting to reform the foreign exchange markets to correct highly overvalued
currencies, as manifested in high black market premia.  These countries all succeeded in
reducing black market premia and all except Malawi accomplished sustained real
devaluation of their currencies. Except for Tanzania and Zaire, they all substantially
reduced or eliminated quantitative restrictions.  Tariff rates, however, were not touched.
Although reversals of reform have been frequent, Ghana, Madagascar, and Nigeria
succeeded in attaining a positive rate of trade integration after the reform, while Tanzania
and Zaire slowed the pace of separation from the world market.  Kenya and Malawi, on
the other hand, either started to separate or increased the pace of separation from the
world market.  In the process, Malawi experienced real  appreciation while Kenya
managed to produce only a negligible amount of devaluation.  In these economies, the rate
of improvement in price distortions was much smaller than in the other reformers. In sum,
non-CFA Sub-Saharan Africa barely  stopped the process of isolation from the world
market after the mid 1980s (see Chart 16 for patterns of integration). CFA members (not
listed in Table 4) failed to devalue their currencies during the 1980s or to carry out other
trade reforms, only to realize the need for substantial devaluation in 1994. The projected
moderate trend increase in trade integration ratio shown in Chart 12 takes account of the
positive future effects froni the 1994 initiatives of the CFA members.
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Most developing countries have been undertaking unilateral liberalization since the
mid 1980s to benefit from the rapidly globalizing market.  This wave of liberalization
represents an effective shift in development strategy from an inward-oriented import-
substituting framework designed strategically to reduce dependence on the outer world, to
an outward-oriented export-promoting framework designed to create a virtuous cycle of
higher integration and faster growth with expanded opportunities.  However, dragging the
legacy of the old frarnework-the  anti-export bias that is typically manifested in
overvalued currency and real exchange rate appreciation-when  one enters the rapidly
globalizing market is dangerous, even suicidal.  A real exchange appreciation not only
prices exports out of world markets, on the demand side, but also takes resources out of
the tradable (export) sector by increasing relative price of nontradables to tradables, on the
supply side.  Aggregate effects of the appreciation on investment are ambiguous; however,
this appreciation unambiguously reduces investments in export-oriented sectors. The
failure to foster productivity and export competitiveness by eliminating anti-export bias in
the open framework has resulted in balance of payment difficulties, forced contraction,
and lower levels of growth. Countries situated in the lower-right quadrant in Chart 17
(Chart 4 reproduced) are the ones that followed an unbalanced path of integration.
Balanced integration into the rapidly globalizing world market calls for sound growth of
exports or for intertemporal collateral of future export growth. This can only be attained
by a prudent combination of complementary domestic and border policies that encourage
long-term productive investment, supported by savings drawn in by higher expected rates
of return due to efficiency gains from reforms that encourage exports.
35Chart 17. Speed of Trade Integration  and GDP Growth, 1970-1992
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36V.  Concluding  Remarks
The growth of world trade relative to world income in the 1990s has been much
higher than anything experienced in the 1970s or 1980s.  Although world trade growth
slowed from a buoyant rate of 6.1 percent a year in the latter half of 1980s, when world
output expanded an average of 3.3 percent a year, it was a positive 4.1 percent a year
during 1991-93, even though world GDP growth was a recessionary 1.1 percent during
the same period.  In 1994, world merchandise trade volume grew an estimated
9.2 percent, which, in relation to 2.8 percent world GDP growth, implies an elasticity of
world trade of 3.3 with respect to GDP.  The average world trade elasticity was 3.7
during 1991-93. This was not only more than twice the trade elasticity of 1.5 prevailing in
the 1970s and 1980s, it also much higher than in any single year in that period, including
1976 and 1984, which, like 1994, were years of cyclical upswing from world recession.
The observed decoupling of world trade and output movements in the early 1990s
was caused by three factors that worked in favor of sustained trade growth in this
recessionary period: the desynchronization of business cycles in the United States, Japan,
and Europe; the continuation and even acceleration of growth in the developing world,
notably in East Asia and Latin America, the new growth poles; and the effective transfer
of purchasing power through a surge in private capital flows to highly absorbent LMIC
regions, namely East Asia and Latin America.
From a longer-term perspective, one can say that this new robustness in world
trade growth has been brought out-at  least to a substantial degree-by  the structural
changes and liberalization drives that many developing countries undertook in the mid
1980s to early 1990s.
The trend toward world integration through trade accelerated sharply in the mid
1980s. Measured by a ratio of trade to output, this meant a reversal in the once-slowed
trend in trade integration for OECD, which had been caused by macroeconomic
instabilities and heightened nontariff barriers in 1970s and early 1980s. For LMIC, this
trend was a new phenomenon; out of a 16 percent rise in LMIC trade integration ratio
(trade/GDP) over the past three decades, a 15 percent surge was observed only after the
mid 1980s, when a series of reform and liberalization efforts enabled LMIC to vigorously
take part in the world market.  The emergence of the LMIC markets, combined with a
decline in commodity prices, a surge in foreign investment activities after the Plaza
Accord,  and a series of bilateral and regional trade arrangements such as the EU and the
US-Canada free trade agreement, helped to accelerate integration in the OECD
economies.
What happened in the early 1990s is often characterized as trade-output
decoupling.  It was an enormous acceleration in the speed of LMIC trade integration into
the world market, which compensated a deceleration in trade integration among the
OECD countries, where the integration is highly pro-cyclical.  With LMICs playing an
37increased role in the world trade market, a robust trade growth of over 6 percent a year,
on average, is projected for the coming decade.
Although the LMIC regions are projected to contribute around 30 percent to
incremental world trade during 1997-2004, prospects for trade integration differ by
region.  East Asia, with its sizable market and autonomous regional integration forces, can
be considered a structural integrator with prospects of sustained integration into the world
market.  Latin America and Eastern Europe and Central Asia have been contingent
integrators in which the process of integration will continue to depend on capital inflow.
The Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa region has been and will continue
to be dependent on favorable terms of trade and capital flows-in  the case of Sub-Saharan
Africa, official flows-for  their integration into the world market.  So far the evidence
shows that only structural integrators have been able to build a sustainable virtuous cycle
of higher speed of integration and higher output/income growth.
The largely unilateral wave of liberalization among developing countries observed
since the mid 1980s represents an effective shift in development strategy from an inward-
oriented to an outward-oriented (export-promoting) framework designed to create a
virtuous cycle of higher integration and faster growth under an expanded opportunity set.
However, evidence shows that dragging the legacy of the old framework-the  anti-export
bias that is typically manifested in overvalued currency-when  one enters the rapidly
globalizing market is dangerous, even suicidal. A real exchange appreciation not only
prices exports out of world markets, on the demand side, but also takes resources out of
the tradable (export) sector by increasing relative price of nontradables to tradables, on the
supply side.
Another problem is that excessive dependence on capital inflow, whether private
investment or official assistance, puts pressure on currency.  Therefore, careful
management is called for. Official assistance, for instance, should not be carelessly
directed to general expenditures that, on balance, favor nontradable sectors.
Balanced integration to the rapidly globalizing world market calls for sound
growth of exports or for intertemporal collateral of future export growth. This can be
attained only by a prudent combination of complementary domestic and border policies
that encourage long-term productive investment in the tradable (exportable) sector,
supported by foreign capital and domestic savings drawn in by higher expected rates of
return due to efficiency gains attained through reforms.  Preserving a perceived rate of
return on investment-in  tradable and complementary sectors-for  both domestic and
foreign investors is a key to becoming a structural integrator in which export and import
capacities both expand in a balanced, sustainable manner.  Further research efforts are
called for in identifying possible paths for LMICs to become sustainable, structural
integrators into the world market.
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39Appendix  A: Classification  of Economies,  1995
Sub-Saharan Africa  Asia  Europe  and Central Asia  Middle East and Norrh  Africa
East and  Eastern
Income  Southern  East  Asia  Europe and  Rest  of  Middle  North
Group  Suberouo  Africa  West Africa  and Pacific  South Asia  Central Asia  EuroDe  Easr  Africa  Americas
Burundi  Benin  cambodia  Afghanistan  Albania  Yemen.  Rep.  Egypt.  Guyana
Comoros  Burkina Faso  China  Bangladesh  Armenia  Arab  Hait
Eritrea  Cenrral African  Lao  PDR  Bhutan  Bosnia and  Rep.  Hondtaru
Ethiopia  Republic.  Mongola  India  Herzegovina  Nicargua
Kenya  Chad  Myanmar  Nepal  Georgia
Lesotho  Cote dilvoire  Viet Namn  Pakistan  Tajikistan
Madagascar  Equatorial  Sd Lanka
Malawi  Guinea
Mozambique  Gambia. The
Low-  Rwanda  Ghana











Angola  Carmeroon  Fiji  Maldives  Azerbaijan  Turkey  man  Islaric  Algeia  Belze
Botswana  Cape Verde  Indonesia  Bulgaria  Rep.  Morocco  Bolivia
Djibouti  Congo  Kiribaa  Croada  Iraq  Tunisia  Colombia
Narmibia  Senegal  Korea Dem.  Czech  Jordan  Costa Rica
Rep.  Republic  Lebanon  Cuba
Swaziland  Marshall  Kazakhstan  Syrian  .Arab  Dominica
Islands  Cyrgyzy  Rep.  Dorninican
Micronesia.  Republic  West Bank  anc  Republc
Fed. Sts.  Lxavia  Gaza  Ecuador
N. Mariana Is.  Lithuania  El Salvador
Papua New  Macedonia  Grenada
Lower  Guinea  YR  Guaternala
Philippines  Moldova  Jamaica
Solomon  Poland  Panama
Islands  Romania  Paraguay
Thailand  Russian  Peru
Tonga  Federaton  St. Vincent and
Vanuatu  Slovak  the Grenadines





Income  Fed.  Rep.
Maurinus  Gabon  Anerican  Belarus  Gibraltar  Bahrain  Libya  Andgua and
Mayotte  Samoa  Estonia  Greece  Oan  Barbuda
Reunion  Guarn  Hungary  Isle of Man  Saudi Armbia  Argenona
Seychelles  Korea. Rep.  Slovenia  Malta  Aruba
South Africa  Macao  Portugal  Barbados
Malaysia  Brazil
New  Chile












subtotal:  170  27  23  26  8  27  6  10  5  38
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income  Southern  Eass Asia  Europe and  Rest of  Middle  North
M  Sub& 8  .ro  .I  Africa  WestAfrica  and  iflc  SouthAsia  Central Asi  Eurone  Easr  Africa  Americas
Aun.aa  Austria  Canada
Ibpan  Belgium  United  States















Brejni  Andorm  ra  I  Bahamas,  The
French  Channel  Kuwait  Bermuda
Polynesia  Islands  Qatar  Cayman
Non OECD  Hong  Kong  Cyprus  United  Arab  Islands
Countries  Singapore  1Feeroe  Islands  Emirates  Virgin
OAEb  Greenland  Islands (U.S.)
I__ __ __ ____  _  ISan  Marino  I
TotaL  - 210  27  23  34  8  27  28  14  5  44
L Forma  Yugoslav  Republic  of  MNdmL
b.  0cr  Asia  eroomicA  -Taiwan.  Mii
For  oper. onal  and  mnlytal purposes  die  World  Bas  main  Definitions of groups
criteuion  for  clifying  ecoomies  is pus nudal product  (GNP)  These  tables  classify  all  World  Bank  member  economies,  and all  other
per capita  Every  ecomomy  is cluifled  s  low-incorne.  middle-income  economics  with  populations  of  mome  than  300,000.
(subdivided  intD  lower  rmiddle  and  upper-middle),  or  high-income.
Other anyDiyl  oupa bae  on geoppric  regions,  exports. and  Income  group: Economies  are divided  according to 1993  GNP per
lvels of extermal  debt,  are  alo used  capita,  calculated  using  the  World  Bank  Artas method,  The  groups  are:
low-income.  S695  or less;  lower-nidde-income.  S696-S2,785;
Low-income  amd  mirddle-lncone  economies e  sorsta  referred  to  upper-middle-income,  S2.786-S8,625;  and  high-income,  SS.626  or  rnore.
as  develoing economies.  The use  of  the  trm is  convenient:  it is not
inteaded  to unply  that  all  economies  in  the  group  are  experiencing  The  estimates  for  the  republics  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  are
simalar  development  or that  other  economies  have  reached  a preferred  preliminary  and  their  classification  wiD  be kept  under  review.
or  fnal stage  of  developmtiaL  Classdication  by income  does  not
necessanly  ret'lct development  stanms.
41Appendix  B: Prospects  for Japan's Trade-Market  Opening?
While  the buoyant  import  demand  in Japan  - in the hiidst  of its sluggish  output
growth  - has been triggered  by the yen's appreciation  and structural  increases  in import
elasticities,  Japan's exports  have not really  grown since 1992,  mainly  due  to a loss in price
competitiveness  also  caused  by the yen's appreciation. Unlike  the past cases  where  Japan
resorted  to an export  drive  when  domestic  activities  became  sluggish  (importation  of
economic  recovery),  Japan  has been 'exporting recovery' during  the period  of current
prolonged  contraction  and stagnancy  (see charts B. 1 and B.2).
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42Stagnant Japanese Exports Due To a Loss in Price Competitiveness
Recent  turbulence  in key currency  exchange  rates has produced  profoundly
different  export  performance  in the affected  countries,  by altering  the relative  positions  of
their regional  and global  price competitiveness. Such effects  are most visible  among  the
OECD  countries,  since  they  trade predominantly  in manufactured  goods that  face higher
price elasticity  of import  demand. In the case of Japan,  the yen's rapid appreciation
coincided  with the period  of sharp downturn after late 1991,  contributing  to the
lengthening  of the downturn  by effectively  ruling out the possibility  of an export drive.
Accordingly,  Japan's exports  have  been stagnant for more than  three years  (see
Chart B.3).
Chart B.3
Changes  in Real  Effective  Exchange  Rates  and Export  Perfonnance,  1992-94
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East Asia as a Major Beneficiary
Negative  effects  on export growth within OECD  economies  (particularly  Japan)
that  have appreciating-  currencies  will be only partially  offset  by rising  exports  in European
industrial  economies  that  have depreciating  currencies,  since those  with depreciating
currencies  have  already  been operating  at a capacity-stretching  level. Export  expansion  in
the United  States  will  be only gradual, given its already  high activity  level and  the
appreciation  of the dollar  vis-a-vis  the Canadian  and Mexican  currencies.  The East Asian
economies,  as the principle  beneficiaries  of the competitiveness  boost resulting  from the
yen's appreciation,  have  been expanding  their exports-and will continue  to do so-by
43finding  new  markets  in Japan and increasing  their market  shares  elsewhere  (see Table
B. 1). Already  in 1994,  these  economies  increased  their share  of the US market  by 2-
3 percent  at the expense  of Japan's share in the same market.
Table B.1
East  Asia:  Changes  In Competitive  Positions  and  Export  Performance
(%  change  between  1992  and  1994)
Real  Effective  Bilateral  Bilateral  Export
Exchange  Rates  Exchange  Rates Exchange  Rates  Volumes
(vs.  $)  (vs.  yen)
Taiwan  -6.9  -5.1  -30.4  14.1
Singapore  3.9  6.2  -16.2  39.7
Hong  Kong  13.2  0.0  -19.6  23.2
China  -19.8  -56.3  -93.7  33.0
South  Korea  -0.4  -2.9  -27.5  20.1
Indonesia  1.8  -6.5  -32.0  15.6
Thailand  0.9  1.0  -22.8  32.4
Malaysia  -4.4  -3.0  -27.7  38.2
Philippines  4.1  -3.6  -28.3  26.9
Note:  Minus  sign  for  changes  in  exchange  rates  represents  depreciation.
Japan is Opening Its Marketfor Imports
Chart B.3 shows  that the strong import growth observed  over the past two years,
despite  sluggish  output  growth,  was brought about  by the appreciation  of the yen, which
lowered  import  prices  denominated  in yen by about 20 percent. With an increasing  degree
of price pass-through  to consumers,  the yen's rapid appreciation  has triggered  a surge in
demand  for imported  consumer  goods.
44Chart  B.3
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Chart B.4 shows that fixed-elasticity estimates of imports largely underestimate
import demand in the most recent period, suggesting structural increases in import
elasticities. Fixed elasticity import demand function is estimated as:
(B.1)  lnIMP=  -1.01 + 1.53 lnGDP-  0.29 lnRWPI
(-1.7)  (16.3)  t=0 -0.0312 (-0.51)
t=l  -0.0647 (-3.00)
t=2  -0.0783 (-4.11)
t=3 -0.0721 (-2.64)
t=4  -0.0460  (-2.13)
AdjustedR-squared  0.942;  D.W.  0.75
Sample Period: 1986ql-1995ql
No. of Observations: 37
where, IMP:  Import Volume Index (SA, 1992ql=100)
GDP: Real GDP Index (SA, 1992ql=100)
RWPI: Relative Price Index (=Import Unit Value Index/Domestic WPI)
(SA, 1992ql=100).
45Chart B.4
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In a recent Economiic  Wh-ite  Paper, Japan' s Econornic Planning Agency (EPA) also
reported increased income and price elasticities of import demand by showing estimated
import demand functions in the following form for two adjacent periods, first quarter
1980-fourth quarter 1986, and first quarter 1987-fourth quarter 1994:Ba
(B  .2)  ln IMP =Const+a  ln GDP+OBln  PZl:  +y ln RWPI
.5~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
where, PZL-l is a lagged index of manufacturing inventory.
In these estimates, income elasticity increased from 1.  15 to 1.85 and price elasticit,v
increased from  -0.40 to -0.55 between the two adjacent periods.
By fur-ther  decomposing income elements into consumption and capital
accumulation, it is shown that most of the surge in income elasticity of demand has come
from the household sector. Estimated import elasticity with respect to consumption
expenditures increased from a negligible level of 0.06 to a strong 2.64 between these
periods.
Japan's  market opening is projected to proceed (see Chart B.5).  Even under a
more serious scenario of financial sector breakdown and renewed recession, however, the
negative effects on Japan's import demand will be rather small. The following factors will
support continuous penetration of foreign goods into Japan's markets:
Bl Economic White Paper Fiscal Year 1995 (in Japanese),  Economic Planning Agency, the Governrnent
of Japan, pp. 519-520.
46*  to stay price competitive,  domestic  manufacturers  are likely to continue  increasing
their reliance  on imported  parts and materials;
*  goods are increasingly  produced  outside  at a lower cost and will be imported  back
to support society's shift to lower-cost  producing  and living;
*  this trend is compatible  with the projected  shift in Japan's saving-investment
differentials  and its decreasing  trade surplus  due to the aging of its population.
Chart  B.5
Percent  Import  Penetration  Into  Japan's  Market
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47Appendix C:  Openness Rankdngs
This appendix  presents  some  sample  country  rankings  by openness  measures." An
unadjusted  ranking by the size of trade/GDP  ratio-where  outputs  are valued  at market
prices and converted  into dollars  using  market exchange  rates-is  presented  in Table  C-1
(1990-92  averages). By this measure,  China appears more open than the US or Japanese
markets  (in this order).
Adjusted  rankings  were created  using:  i) real (1987 US$)  values  of export  and
import  of merchandise  collected  for the period 1990-1992;  ii) population  data; and  iii)
outputs  evaluated  using  IMF purchasing  power  parity (PPP) scales for 130  countries
covering  the sarne  period.
In the first column  of Table C-2,  countries  are ranked  by 'Trade/PPP-GDP  Ratio'
averaged  for 1990-92. When outputs  are adjusted  using purchasing  power  parity,  the
Japanese  and US markets  appear  more  open than China's, thus reversing  the ranking  order
made using the standard  output measure.
In the second  column  of Table  C-2, per capita trade figures  for Japan  and the
United  States-using  1987  trade valued  in US$, averaged  for 1990-92-are even  larger
than  those  for Malaysia.
Chart C. 1 shows  the relationship  between trade/output  ratio and output  when
purchasing  power  parity conversions  are used in the computation  of outputs. In the last
column  of Table C-3, "Trade/PPP-GDP  Ratio" was further  adjusted  for the size of the
economies. In this column,  countries  were ranked  by the ratio of their actual  "Trade/PPP-
GDP Ratio"  to an average  "Trade/PPP-GDP  Ratio" for economies  of the same  size,
measured  in purchasing  power  parity. Fitted values obtained  through  the following
regression  equation,  estimated  over a cross-section  of data for 129  countries,  were used as
relevant  averages  (see Chart C.2):c 2
(C.1)  (Trade!pppGDP)  =  a +  .1npppGDP+,y  (InpppGDP) 2.
Then, the ratios used for the ranking  were computed  simply  as:
(C.2)  Ratio = (actual  Trade/pppGDP  ratio)/(fitted  Trade/pppGDP  ratio).
cl For motivation  and issues  related to a ranking  of countries  by openness,  see arguments  presented  in
Section  m of the main text and footnotes  16 and 19.
C2. Similar adjustments  using GDP, per capita  GDP, and population  are fairly comnon in comparing
trade/GDP  ratios. See,  for example,  Hollis  B. Chenery  and Moshe  Syrquin,  Patterns  of Development,
1950-70, Oxford University  Press, 1975;  or Moshe  Syrquin and Hollis  B. Chenery,  "Patterns  of
Development,  1950  to 1983," World Bank Discussion Papers, No. 41, 1989.
48Chart C.  1
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49It is shown  that,  if size effects  are accounted  for, China's openness  to international
trade ranks very low-certainly lower than that of the Unites States or Japan-among 129
economies  evaluated  in this study. Its lack of openness to imports,  in particular,  seems  to
be a reason for this low  ranking. This small ratio is the product  of still  tighter  import
controls  and isolation  of inner  areas  of the economy from world  markets. Putting  it in a
different  way, this result  also implies  China's great potential  for integration  into the world
market through  international  trade.c 3
c3 For further discussion  on China's  growth and import potential, see Andrea  Boltho,  Uri Dadush,  Dong
He, and Shigeru  Otsubo,  "China's Emergence:  Prospects,  Opportunities,  and Challenges,"  World  Bank
Policy Research  Papers,  No. 1339,  1994.
50Table C-1 Openness Ranking (Unadjusted)
Rank  TradeimktGDPRatlo  - Rn,-  .TJrMV
1  Singapore  359.6  1  68  Sri Lanka  45.0  68
2  Hong  Kong  273.5  2  69  Sierra Leone  44.8  69
3  Bahrain  158.2  3  70  United  Kingdom  44.6  70
4  Swaziland  147.7  4  71  Zimbabwe  43.9  71
5  Panama  138.6  5  72  New  Zeabnd  43.1  72
6  Guyana  132.5  6  73  Guinea  43.1  73
7  Malaysia  130.9  7  74  Guinea-Bissau  43.0  74
8  Malta  122.7  8  75  Suriname  43.0  75
9  Botswana  113.6  9  76  Yemen,  Rep.  42.0  76
10  Belgium-Luxembourg  111.1  10  77  Yugoslavia  41.7  77
11  Lesotho  106.6  11  78  Finland  41.0  78
12  Namibia  104.4  12  79  South  Africa  40.7  79
13  Mlauritius  98.6  13  80  Chad  39.9  80
14  Ireland  98.3  14  81  Ghana  39.0  81
15  Djibouti  94.4  15  82  Morocco  38.8  82
16  Syrian  Arab Rep.  92.9  16  83  Barbados  38.3  83
17  Taiwan  88.9  17  84  France  37.2  84
18  Kuwait  88.6  18  85  Uruguay  36.9  85
19  UnitedArabEmirates  88.4  19  86  Spain  36.6  86
20  Hungary  84.8  20  87  Greece  36.5  87
21  Gambia.  The  83.4  21  88  Dominican  Rep.  36.3  88
22  Equatorial  Guinea  82.7  22  89  Ecuador  36.2  89
23  Portugal  82.6  23  90  Sene I  35.8  90
24  Netherlands  82.1  24  91  Venezuela  35.3  91
25  Zambia  82.0  25  92  Colombia  35.0  92
26  Czechoslovakia  80.9  26  93  Burkina  Faso  34.5  93
27  Mauritania  74.1  27  94  Italy  34.3  94
28  Onman  73.8  28  95  El Salvador  33.9  95
29  Papua  New  Guinea  73.7  29  96  Btlgaria  33.8  96
30  Gabon  73.1  30  97  Pakistan  33.5  97
31  Togo  71.0  31  98  Mali  33.3  98
32  Switzerland  70.2  32  99  Guatemala  33.3  99
33  Saudi  Arabia  66.9  33  100  Honduras  33.0  100
34  Jamaica  66.3  34  101  Romania  32.3  101
35  Korea,  Rep.  65.0  35  102  Bolivia  32.2  102
36  Jordan  64.8  36  103  Comoros  31.7  103
37  Benin  64.7  37  104  Cameroon  31.6  104
38  Thailand  63.3  38  105  Tanzania  31.6  105
39  Tunisia  63.0  39  106  Egypt,Arab  Rep.  31.2  106
40  Congo  61.7  40  107  Australia  30.2  107
41  Austria  61.6  41  108  Turkey  29.4  108
42  Norway  61.6  42  109  Uganda  28.3  109
43  Costa  Rica  60.2  43  110  Cbihu  27.8  110
44  Liberia  60.1  44  111  Kenya  27.6  111
45  Coted'lvoire  58.0  45  112  Central  African Rep.  27.4  112
46  Fiji  57.3  46  113  Peru  26.8  113
47  Paraguay  57.1  47  114  Nicaragua  26.2  114
48  Denmark  57.1  48  115  Madagascar  26.0  115
49  Cyprus  57.1  49  116  Niger  26.0  116
50  Seychelles  57.1  50  117  Algeria  25.6  117
51  Israel  54.3  51  118  Nepal  24.3  118
52  Trinidad  and  Tobago  54.2  52  119  Bangladesh  24.1  119
53  Angola  54.1  53  120  Somalia  23.6  120
54  Sweden  52.5  54  121  Iran, Islamic  Rep.  22.0  121
55  Philippines  51.5  55  122  Burundi  22.0  122
56  Canada  50.8  56  123  Iraq  20.7  123
57  Mexico  49.6  57  124  Haiti  19.2  124
58  Malawi  49.1  58  125  Brazil  17.6  125
59  Germany  48.8  59  126  United  States  17.0  126
60  SaoTomeand  The Principe  48.5  60  127  Ethiopia  16.8  127
61  Poland  48.5  61  128  Rwanda  15.1  128
62  Cape  Verde  48.5  62  129  Japan  15.1  129
63  Indonesia  48.3  63  130  Argentina  15.1  130
64  Chile  47.9  64  131  Former  USSR  14.2  131
65  Nigeria  47.2  65  132  Myanmar  13.0  132
66  Zaire  46.9  66  133  India  11.9  133
67  Iceland  45.6  67  134  Sudan  6.6  134
51Table  C-2  Openness  Ranking  (Adjusted)
Rank  radeppGDP  Rdlao', 
1  Singapore  214.9  Singapore  37,08  S.
2  Hong Kong  191.0  Hong Kong  26,981 Hong  Kong  5
3  lreland  154.5  Switzerland  19,250 Ireland  4.2
4  Bahrain  137.3 United  Arab Emtirates  17,279 Bahrain  _4.0 
5  Netherlands  114.7  Netherlands  13,507  Malta
6  Malta  109.2  Norway  12,146  Netherlands  3.  6
7  United  Arab Emirates  103.9  Denmark  11,837 United Arab Emirates  2.8  7
8  Denmark  943 Bahrain  11794  Panara  2.7  _
9  Panama  93.9 Ireland  10,896 Seychelles  2.6  I
10  Austria  93.7 Austria  10,670  Denmark  2.5  1t
11  Switzerland  90.4  Sweden  10,281  Austria  2.5  1
12  Taiwan  86.3  Canada  8,240  Switzerland  2.  12
13  Norway  84.10  Germany  7,95 Taiwan  Zq 3
14  Sweden  79.0 Finland  7,50 Norway  2.3  14
15  Germany  72.6 Malta  7,165 Germany  2.  3
16  Botswana  64.1  France  6,531 Sweden  2.  1t
17  Swaziland  62! Taiwan  5.714  Swaziland  2.0  1
18  Portugal  623 United Kingdomn  5,645 Botswana  1d  11
19  Seychelles  61  Israel  5,137  Gabon  1  1  19
20  Gabon  618Iay4,982  Portup  1I  2
21  Finland  61.0  Kuwait  4,980  Finland  1d  21
22  Malavsia  57.1 New  Zealand  4,633 Malaysia-  1.  22
23  Oman  5  Oman  4,618 Oman  1.1  2
24  Israei  53.0 Australia  3 981 France  1.!  24
25  France  51.6 Cvprus  3,905 Equatoriai Guinea  1.!  25
26  Canada  51.0  Saudi Arabia  3,815 Canada  1u  26
27  Korea, Rep.  49.1 Portugal  3,576 Israel  1  27
28  Saudi Arabia  473 Japait  31528  Suriname  1.4  28
29  United Kingdom  472 TJnited  States  3277  United  Kin  14  2
30  Cyprus  47.0 Malaysia  3,232 Guyana  1n  a
31  New  Zealand  46.0 Spain  3,195 KoreawRep.  - 1A  3'
32  Kuwait  44.8 Panama  2,918  Cypris  13  32
33  Suriname  43.1 Korea, Rep  2,876  Gambia,  The13  31
34  Italy  41.2 Gabon  2,754  Saudi  Arabia  1,:  34
35  Spain  40.9 Seychelles  2,603 New  Zealand  1  a
36  Guyana  404 Czechoslovakia  2,332 Kuwait  1.2  36
37  Mauritius  40.2 Barbados  2,218 Italy  1.2  37
38  Cote d'lvoire  39!5  Mauritius  2,070 Mauritius  1.  38
39  Hungary  37.9  Trinidad and Tobago  2,052 Spain  1.  3<
40  Czechoslovakia  37.7 Yugoslavia  1,968 Cote d'lvoire  t.1  41
41  Papua New  Guinea  373 Botswana  1,966 Papua New  Guinea  1.  4
42  Gambia, The  363 Hungary  1,903 Liberia  1  4.
43  Equatorial Guinea  35.8 Greece  1,816 Barbados  1.1  4
44  Jamaica  34.8 Suriname  1,514 Hungary  1.(  4
45  Liberia  33.5 Swaziland  1,287 Czechoslovakia  1.1  45
46  Barbados  33.0 Fiji  1,121 Jamaica  1.(  4t
47  Congo  31.7 Jordan  1,051 Fiji  1.1  47
48  Fiji  31.5 Costa Rica  1,035 Congo  0o  48
49  Zambia  31.0  SyrianArab  Rep.  1,007 Zambia  0.9  4
50  Australia  30.2 Bulgania  981 Guinea  0.9  5t
51  Guinea  30.0 Chile  972 Mauritania  0.9  51
52  Greece  29.7 Venezuela  963  J8Dan  n8  52
53  Costa Rica  29.7 Jamaica  948 Sao Tome  and The Principe  0.8  53
54  Mauritania  284 Mexico  942 Australia  0.e  54
55  Tunisia  27.7  Uruguay  927 Costa Rica  0d  5'
56  Japan  273 South  Africa  890 Contoros  0.t  5t
57  Togo  26.7 Tunisia  867 Greece  0.8  57
58  Jordan  26.1 Thailand  860 Too  a  51
59  Trinidad and Tobago  24.6 Poland  730 Tunisia  0.7  59
60  Paraguay  24.4 Algeria  660 Jordan  0.7  °  60
61  Honduras  242 Congo  649 Honduras  0.7  61
62  Yugoslavia  24.1 Papua New  Guinea  637 Trinidad and Tobago  0.7  62
63  Thailand  24.0 Iran, Lslamic  Rep.  619 Benin  0.7  63
64  Benin  23.6 Paraguay  576 Pagy  0.7  64
65  Iran, Islamic Rep.  23A Guyana  551 Thailand  0.7  65
66  Syrian Arab Rep.  21.7 Turkey  513 Cape Verde  0.7  6
67  Senegal  20.9 Ar  endna  509  Yugoslavla  0.  67
5226-
68  Zibbe20.8  Cote d'lvoire  450a,llmcRp  .e  6
69  Cmrs20.1  Zdomobia  447 Untd  tts  e  6
70  lChile  20.1 Ecuador  421 Snepa  0.  7
71  lPoland  18.6 Romania  408 Syrian Arab Rep.  0.6  71
72  Camroon  18A Former  USSR  361 Zimbabwe  0.6  72
73  United States  18.2 Mauritania  355 Chile  0.5  73
74  Uruguay  18.0 Morocco  340 Lesotho  0.5  74
75  Cape  Verde  18.0 Brazil  336 Carneroon  0.5  75
76  El Salvador  17.7 Philippines  316 Poland  0.5  76
77  Mexico  17.7 El Salvador  315 Mexico  0.5  77
78  South Africa  17.7 Lesotho  296  Nicaragua  0.5  78
79  icarazua  17.4 Honduras  293  El Salvador  0.5  79
80  Philippines  172 Iraq  291 Uruguay  0.5  8
8t  lLesotho  16.9 Guatemala  289 South Africa  0.5  81
82  Sao Tome and The Principe  16.9 Nicaragua  284 Chad  0.5  82
83  lVenezuela  16.6  Cape  Verde  279 Philippines  0.5  83
84  orocco  16.2 Zimbabwe  279 Mall  0.5  84
85  Yemen, Rep.  16.1  Liberia  273 Venezuela  0.4  85
86  Chad  15.8 Peru  266 Btrkina  Faso  0.4  86
87  Ecuador  15.7 Cameroon  265 Yemen, Rep.  0.4  87
88  Mali  15.7 Indonesia  264 Morocco  0.4  88
89  wurkina  Faso  153 Domninican  Rep.  260 Ecuador  0.4  89
90  Bulgaria  15.0 Togo  255 Malawi  0.4  90
91  Turkey  14S5  Equatorial Guinea  252 Bulgaria  0.4  91
92  divia  14.3 Gambia, The  246 Turkey  0.4  92
93  Algeria  14.1 Senepal  239 Bolivia  0.4  93
94  Maawi  13.9 Bolivia  235 Niger  0.4  94
95  Roma  13.5 Egypt, Arab  Rep.  231 Guinea-Bissau  0.4  95
96  Guatemala  13.5 Yemen. Rep.  231 Algeria  0.4  96
97  iger  13.2 Berin  227 Guatemala  0.4  97
98  Argentina  13.2 Zambia  221 Ronmnia  0.4  98
99  Colombia  12.7 Sri Lanka  207 Ar  endna  0.4  99
100  Indonesia  12.7 Sao  Tome and The Principe  186 Indonesia  0.4  100
101  Nigeria  12.6 Guinea  181 Colombia  0.3  101
102  Dominican Rep.  11  Nigeria  167 Nigeria  0.3  102
103  Kenya  11.6 Ghana  155 Central African  Rep.  0.3  103
104  Peru  11.6 Comoros  131 Dominican Rep.  0.3  104
105  Central African  Rep.  11.0 Pakistan  121 Kenya  0.3  105
106  Guinea-Bissau  10.9 Kenya  107 Peru  0.3  106
107  Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  10.9 Central African  Rep.  97 Tanzania  0.3  107
108  Tanzania  10.9 Burkina Faso  88 E ypt,Arab  Rep.  0.3  108
109  Sri  1anka  0.3 Mali  85 Madagascar  0.3  109
110  Madagascar  9.9  Zaire  84 Sri  Lanka  0.3  110
1t1  Zai re  9.6  Guinea-Bissau  82 Zaire  0.3  111
112  Gha  na  8.9  China  82 Burundi  0.3  112
1  1  3  Burundi  8.5  Niger  77 Ghana  0.2  113
114  Uganda  8.3  Malawi  73 Brazil  0.2  114
tt5  Brazl  8.2  Chad  72 Sierra Leone  0.2  115
116  Sierra Leone  7.8 Sierra Leone  64 Uganda  0.2  116
117  Iraq  7.8 Madagascar  59 Rwanda  0.2  117
118  Ethiopia  7.8 Haiti  57 Fonmer USSR  0.2  118
119  Rwanda  7.6 Tanzania  56 Ethiopia  0.2  119
120  Pakistan  7-'  Ugan da  52 Iraq  0.2  120
121  Former  USSR  7.1 Burundi  51 China  0.2  121
122  Cina  6.8 Rwnda  48  Pakistan  0.2  122
123  Haiti  6.2  India  44 Haiti  0.2  123
124  Myanmiar  6.0  Bangladesh  44 Somatia  0.2  124
125  Bangladesh  5.9 Sudan  43 Myanmar  0.2  125
126  Somalia  5.7 Nepal  43 India  0.2  126
127  India  5.6 Myanmiar  31 Banpjadesh  0.2  127
128  Nepal  4.6 Somalia  26 Nepal  0.1  128
1129  iSudan  4.5 Ethiopia  23 Sudan  0.1  129
a/  Average for 1990-92
b/  Average for 1990-92 values in 1987US$.
r-t Adjustment for the size of economy using pppGDP.
Ratio = (actural Trade / pppGDP ratio) / (fitted Trade / pppGDP ratio)
where fitted  values are obtained using the following  regression:
(Trade / pppGDP) = a + b ln(pppGDP) + c (ln(pppGDP))
2
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